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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
Context 
This report summarizes work done for NASA Langley Research Center as part of the Airspace 
Systems Program (Airportal Project), under Contract number NNX07AT23A.The air transportation 
system is a significant driver of the U.S. economy, providing safe, affordable, and rapid transportation. 
During the past three decades airspace and airport capacity has not grown in step with demand for air 
transportation which is projected to grow at average annual growth  of +4% (BTS, 2010). The failure to 
increase capacity at the same rate as the growth in demand will result in unreliable service and systemic 
delays (BTS, 2010). Estimates of the impact of delays and unreliable air transportation service on the 
economy range from $32B/year (NEXTOR, 2010) to $41B/year (Schumer, 2008). 
 
Government and industry are collaborating to address the capacity-demand imbalance via three 
approaches: 
 
1. Increasing the capacity of the airports and airspace to handle additional flights. The Airport 
Improvement Plan (2010) is designed to relieve the bottlenecks at U.S. airports by adding runways, 
taxiways, gates, terminal buildings and service facilities to key nodes of the air-transportation system.   
 
The impact of these initiatives on the most capacitated airports is limited due to the lack of additional 
real-estate to accommodate needed infrastructure (e.g. additional runways). 
 
Special use airspace (e.g. military use only) is also being made available to increase the number of 
flights that can be handled during periods of peak demand.  
 
Plans are also underway to improve landing and takeoff technologies that will allow ―all weather‖ 
operations.  
 
2. Modernization of U.S. Air Traffic Control (ATC) infrastructure. A $37B modernization 
program, known as NextGen, will improve productivity and the utilization of existing airspace. This will 
yield increases in the effective-capacity of the airspace and airports. Improvements in flow management, 
airborne re-routing, 4-D coordination of flights, and super-dense operations will increase the number of 
flights that can be handled during peak-periods. Estimates for increasing effective capacity at the 
bottlenecks range from a total increase of 10% to 30%. These increases are significantly lower than a 
compounded 4% annual growth rate in demand. 
  
3. Increase Passenger Capacity per Flight. This approach incentivizes airlines to increase the size 
of aircraft to transport more passengers per runway/airspace slots. To create these incentives the 
government or port authority regulates the number of scheduled flights to match the number of runway 
slots and gates available. The slots are allocated to ensure competition between airlines to maintain 
competitive airfares and service, as well as to provide economies of scale and network integrity for airline 
networks. Allocation schemes range from administrative (e.g. grandfathering, voluntary agreements 
between airlines and the FAA, or political allocations) to market-based mechanisms (e.g. congestion 
pricing, auctions). Care must be taken to ensure the most efficient economic and socio-political use of the 




Currently there is not enough emphasis is being placed on the third approach, improved utilization 
through increased aircraft size. 
 
The idea of improved utilization of runway/airspace capacity through increased aircraft size gained 
some traction in 2007 and 2008. A Department of Transportation initiative coordinated capacity limits at 
the three New York airports: JFK - 81 per hour (1/18/2008), EWR - 81 per hour (5/21/2008), LGA - 
decreased from 75/hour + 6 unscheduled to 71/hour + 3 unscheduled (1/15/2009). The slots at each of the 
airports were allocated by grandfathering. The concept of auctioning the slots to maximize the economic 
efficiency in the allocation and to ensure competitive airfares and service met strong criticism and was 
withdrawn.  
 
The objections to the concept were based on concerns that the introduction of capacity limits and 
market-based allocation schemes would affect: 
 
1. Geographic access to air transportation service (i.e. elimination of service at smaller 
markets) 
2. Economic access to air transportation service (i.e. increased operational costs could lead to 
increased airfares, that might be too costly for certain segments of the population. 
3. Airline finances in a negative manner (i.e. reduced profits due to additional costs of 
operation) 
4. Air Transportation Efficiency as measured by the seats per runway/airspace slot (also 
known as aircraft size or aircraft gauge), by the total arrival and departure seats, and by the 
total available seat miles scheduled in and out of the target airport.   
Objective & Method 
This report describes the results of an analysis of airline strategic decision-making that affects: (1) 
geographic access, (2) economic access, and (3) airline finances. This report extends the analysis of these 
factors using historic data (provided in Part 1 of the report). 
 
The Airline Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) was used to evaluate how exogenous factors 
(passenger demand, airline operating costs, and airport capacity limits) affect geographic access (markets-
served, scheduled flights, aircraft size), economic access (airfares), airline finances (profit), and air 
transportation efficiency (aircraft size). 
 
This analysis captures the impact of the implementation of capacity limits at the airports, as well as 
the effect of increased costs of operation (i.e. hedged fuel prices). The increases in costs of operation 
serve as a proxy for increased costs per flight that might occur if auctions or congestion pricing are 
imposed. The model also incorporates demand elasticity curves based on historical data that provide 
information about how passenger demand is affected by airfare changes. 
Results 
Two analyses were conducted. The first experiment examined airline strategic decision-making in 
response to the introduction of airport capacity limits for three fixed passenger demand and operating 
costs scenarios (i.e. Gross Domestic Product and Hedged Fuel Prices).  The design of the experiment 
included 45 possible treatments (five airports times three capacity levels times three demand and 
operating cost changes). 
The second experiment examined airline strategic decision-making in response to the introduction of 
airport capacity limits for varying operating cost conditions (i.e. hedged fuel prices) for fixed passenger 
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demand (based on a given economic situation as described by Gross Domestic Product).  The design of 
the experiment, summarized in the table below, included 18 possible treatments (one airport times three 
capacity levels times three hedged fuel prices times two values for Gross Domestic Product). 
 
Statistically significant trends with a confidence interval of 95% were as follows: 
 
Note:  The ASOM model is based on the assumption of a benevolent monopolist.  Thus, this is the 
best that one can expect in terms of up-gauging.  With competition among airlines, it is likely that the 
demand will be shared among airlines and up-gauging will be somewhat reduced.  
 
Geographic Access. The number of markets with direct Metroplex airport service is determined by 
passenger demand, operating costs, and airport capacity limits (R2=83%). The number of flights per day 
to a market is also determined by passenger demand, operating costs, and airport capacity limits 
(R2=88%).  
 
1. The growth/decay in demand for air transportation is often attributed to economic conditions.  
A proxy for overall National economic health, changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), is 
used to examine changes in impact to the number of markets served and scheduled flights per 
day. A linear regression on the results of the ASOM showed that for every incremental 
increase in the GDP index, there is an increase of 1.8 in the number of markets with direct 
service. Similarly, a linear regression showed that for every incremental increase in the GDP 
index, there is an increase of 17.3 in the number of scheduled flights per day across all 
markets.  
 
2. The fluctuations in hedged fuel prices (which impacts airline operational costs) also impacts 
markets served and flights per day. A linear regression showed that for every $1 increase in 
hedged fuel prices, there is a decrease of 1.9 in the number of markets with direct service and 
a decrease of 17.8 in the total number of scheduled flights per day across all markets  
 
3. The introduction of Capacity Limits (as measured by limits on number of operations per 
hour) is a determinant of the number of markets served and scheduled flights per day. A 
linear regression showed that for every additional operation per hour allowed, there is an 
increase of 0.1 in the number of markets with direct service and an increase of 2.4 in the 
number of scheduled flights per day across all markets. 
 
Economic Accessibility. Passenger accessibility to air transportation is determined by airfares. 
Changes in the economy affect demand for air transportation. Changes in fuel prices reflected in changes 
in airfares also affect the demand for transportation. In general, the model results indicate that an 
economic downturn has an order of magnitude greater effect on airline airfares than does the change in 
airlines’ operating costs.  
 
1. Cumulative elasticity at the airports ranged between -3.1 to -1.8 during this period. 
Specifically, a 1% increase in airfare (e.g. $300 to $303) resulted in a 3% reduction in 
demand for air service at that fare. This result is consistent with prior studies that show 
passenger demand to be relatively elastic. 
 
2. The change in airfare was driven by changes in hedged fuel prices (which impacts airline 
operational costs) (R2=83.1%).  At the five airports studied (LGA, JFK, EWR, PHL, and 
SFO), every $1 increase in hedged per-gallon fuel prices resulted in an average of $16 
increase in airfares, which yielded an average reduction in passenger demand of 1.5%. This 
result is valid within the hedged fuel price range of $1.50 and $4 per gallon. 
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Airline Profitability.  Airline profitability for the routes serviced at these five airports is a complex 
phenomenon driven by demand for air transportation, passenger’s responses to airfare, and airline 
operating costs.  
 
Changes in airline profits are driven by changes in economic conditions (as measured in this study by 
GDP), operational costs (as measured in this study by hedged fuel prices), aircraft size, and flights per day 
(R2=94.9%).  For example for passenger demand and operations at EWR, daily airline profits were 
increased $456K for every $1 increase in hedged fuel prices, increased $423K for every incremental 
increase in the GDP index, reduced $8K for every seat increase in aircraft gauge, and increased $6K for 
every additional flight per day.   This result is valid within the hedged fuel price range of $1.50 and $4 per 
gallon. 
 
Note that airline profits are affected by the airline’s ability to: (1) increase airfares as fast as hedged 
fuel prices increase, (2) shed less profitable markets in order to improve profitability, and (3) right-size 
aircraft to maintain profitability as demand changes.  
 
Air Transportation Efficiency: Air transportation efficiency is measured by the throughput of 
passengers through the network based on aircraft size (i.e. number of seats) per runway/airspace. A linear 
regression showed that for every incremental increase in the GDP index, there is a 12.5 seat increase in 
the average aircraft size flown. Also, for every $1 increase in hedged fuel prices, there is a 6.4 seat 
increase in the average aircraft size flown.   
 
Note: These results are not consistent with the observed historical data. The historical data did not 
show the up-gauging results from the ASOM model. There are several explanations for this, including: 
airline competition, fleet inflexibility, and airline pilot union scope clauses. 
Implications of Results 
The results of the analysis using the ASOM have the following implications: 
 
1. The Air Transportation System is robust: Geographic access, economic access, airline 
profitability, and air transportation efficiency exhibit proportional and stable relationships:  
 
 For a fixed passenger demand and hedged fuel price, as capacity limits are imposed (e.g. -
10%), markets are reduced (-5%) and scheduled flights decrease (-8%), profit decreases (-
4%). In this scenario average aircraft size increases (1%).  
 
 For a fixed passenger demand and fixed capacity limits at the airports, as hedged fuel prices 
increase (e.g. +43%), markets are reduced (-3%), scheduled flights per day decrease (-6%), 
profit increases (+4%). In this scenario average aircraft size increases (+10%). This result is 
valid within the hedged fuel price range of $1.50 and $4 per gallon. 
 
2. Airport Capacity limits have no negative effects: when regulatory authorities choose to impose 
capacity limits on runway access in order to reduce congestion, little impact is seen on geographic access, 
economic access, and airline profits. Aircraft size does not change, but congestion and delays are 
significantly improved. Note: even in a model that does not take into consideration an airline’s likelihood 
to continue access to markets during economic downturns for strategic (competitive) reasons, little to no 
change in markets served is observed when capacity restrictions are imposed. 
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3. Hedged fuel prices and economic health drive air transportation performance:  Regulatory 
authority to manipulate the market through the introduction of airport capacity (and airport capacity 
limits) is only one of three factors affecting geographic access, market access, and airline financial 
stability. When airline operating costs increase significantly, or when the economic health of the nation 
changes dramatically, significant effects on airline behavior are observed. 
 
For example, for a fixed passenger demand and fixed capacity limits at the airports, as hedged fuel 
prices increase (e.g. +43%), markets are reduced (-3%), scheduled flights per day decrease (-6%), profit 
increases (+4%). In this scenario average aircraft size increases (+10%). This result is valid within the 
hedged fuel price range of $1.50 and $4 per gallon. 
 
3. In the presence of increased passenger demand (and in the absence of cut-throat airline 
competition) airlines will increase aircraft size.  However, the ability to up-gauge in the real-world is 
restricted by additional factors not modeled: (1) lack of available aircraft at the 90-120 seat size (2) the 
airline’s preference toward frequency (in order to maintain market share and provide passengers with 
more time-specific options), and (3) labor cost structure for pilots, which is significantly higher for larger 
aircraft than for regional jets.  
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The air transportation system is a significant driver of the U.S. economy, providing safe, affordable, 
and rapid transportation.  
 
During the past three decades airspace and airport capacity has not grown in step with demand for air 
transportation (+4% annual growth), resulting in unreliable service and systemic delays.  
 
Estimates of the impact of delays and unreliable air transportation service on the economy range from 
$32.3 B/year (NEXTOR, 2010) to $41B/year (Schumer, 2008). 
 
Government and industry are collaborating to address the capacity-demand imbalance via three 
initiatives:  
(1) Increasing Infrastructure Capacity,  
(2) Increasing Effective-Capacity and Productivity, and  
(3) Increasing Runway/Airspace Efficiency by Increasing Seat Capacity per slot. 
Increasing Infrastructure Capacity 
Several initiatives are underway to increase the capacity of the airports and airspace to handle 
additional flights. The Airport Improvement Plan (2010) is designed to relieve the bottlenecks at U.S. 
airports by adding runways, taxiways, gates, terminal buildings and service facilities to key nodes of the 
air-transportation system.   
 
The Airports Improvement Program (AIP) is administered by the FAA and funded from the Airport 
and Airway Trust Fund (A&ATF). The A&ATF is created from user fees (e.g. 7.5% ticket tax) and fuel 
taxes.  
 
The AIP provides about 18% of the capital funds for improvements that include enhancements of 
capacity, safety, and other aspects of airport infrastructure.  AIP funds are also applied toward projects 
that ―support aircraft operations including runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, 
and safety, emergency or snow removal equipment‖ (Kirk, 2003; p. 3). To be eligible for AIP funding, 
airports must be part of the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), which imposes 
requirements on the airport for legal and financial compliance (Wells & Young, 2003; p. 329). 
 
The NPIAS has two goals: To ensure that airports are able to accommodate the growth in travel, and 
to keep airports up to regulatory standards (FAA, 2008; p. v). 
 
The AIP funds are distributed to passenger, cargo, and general aviation airports, in two categories 
(Kirk, 2003; pp. 6-7): 
 
1. Formula funds: Formula funds (also known as ―apportionments‖) are apportioned according to 
formulas based on the volume of throughput (e.g. enplaned passengers) and location. The formulas vary 
depending on the type of airport. 
 
2. Discretionary funds: Discretionary funds are approved by the FAA and are distributed based on 
factors such as project priority and congressional mandates. Although it is not the sole determinant factor, 
project selections are based on a project’s score in the National Priority Rating (NPR) equation, which 
assigns projects a rating from 0 to 100 (high or 100% aligned with agency goals) (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2000; p. 5). Projects with safety and security purposes receive higher ratings than those 
focused on capacity (Dillingham, 2000; p. 32). 
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Special use airspace (e.g. military use only) is also being made available to increase the number of 
flights that can be handled during periods of peak demand.  
 
The impact that these initiatives will have on system-wide bottlenecks at the most capacitated airports 
is limited due to the lack of additional real-estate to accommodate needed infrastructure.  
 
Increasing Effective-Capacity and Productivity 
 
Modernization of U.S. Air Traffic Control (ATC), known as NextGen, is a $37B program. NextGen 
will improve productivity and the utilization of existing airspace yielding increases in the effective-
capacity of the airspace and airports. Improvements in flow management, airborne re-routing, 4-D 
coordination of flights, and super-dense operations will increase the number of flights that can be handled 
during peak-periods.  
 
NextGen is an umbrella term for the ongoing, wide-ranging transformation of the National Airspace 
System (NAS). At its most basic level, NextGen represents an evolution from a ground-based system of 
air traffic control to a satellite-based system of air traffic management. This evolution is vital to meeting 
future demand, and to avoiding gridlock in the sky and at the nation’s airports (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010; p. 4). 
 
NextGen will realize these goals through the development of aviation-specific applications for 
existing, widely-used technologies, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and technological 
innovation in areas such as weather forecasting, data networking and digital communications. Hand in 
hand with state-of-the-art technology will be new procedures, including the shift of certain decision-
making responsibility from the ground to the cockpit. 
 
When fully implemented, NextGen will allow more aircraft to safely fly closer together on more 
direct routes, reducing delays and providing unprecedented benefits for the environment and the economy 
through reductions in carbon emissions, fuel consumption and noise.   
 
FAA estimates show that by 2018, NextGen will reduce total flight delays by about 21 percent while 
providing $22 billion in cumulative benefits to the traveling public, aircraft operators and the FAA. In the 
process, more than 1.4 billion gallons of fuel will be saved during this period, cutting carbon dioxide 
emissions by nearly 14 million tons. These estimates assume that flight operations will increase 19 
percent at 35 major U.S. airports between 2009 and 2018, as projected in the FAA’s 2009 traffic forecast. 
 
Estimates for increasing effective capacity at the bottlenecks range from a total increase of 10% to 
30%. These increases are significantly lower than a compounded 4% growth rate in demand. 
Increasing Runway/Airspace Efficiency by Increasing Seat Capacity per slot 
This approach incentivizes airlines to increase the size of aircraft to transport more passengers per 
runway/airspace slots. To create these incentives the government or port authority: (i) regulates the 
number of runway slots and gates available to match the available supply, (ii) allocates the available slots 
through some combination of administrative (e.g. grandfathering) and market-based mechanisms (e.g. 
congestion pricing, auctions). The allocation of slots must be accomplished in a way that ensures the most 





Currently there is not enough emphasis is being placed on improved utilization of the air 
transportation system through increased aircraft size. 
 
The idea of improved utilization of runway/airspace capacity through increased aircraft size is mired 
in uncertainty about the impacts on the stakeholders and unintended consequences. 
 
In 2008, the concept of market-based methods gained some traction at the congested New York 
airports. The Departments of Transportation (DOT) proposed a rule to limit the number of arrivals and 
departures at the New York airports and to allocate some of the slots via an auction (Federal Registry 
volume 73, pages 60544-60601). 
 
The rule was designed to establish procedures to address congestion in the New York City area by 
assigning slots at airports in a way that allows carriers to respond to market forces to drive efficient airline 
behavior. Specifically the rule: 
 extended the capacity limit on the operations at the three airports 
 assigned the majority of slots at the airports to existing operators, 
 develops a robust secondary market by annually auctioning off a limited number of slots in 
each of the first five years of this rule.  
 
Auction proceeds would remain within the aviation industry and be used to mitigate aviation 
congestion and delay in the New York City area. The rule also contained provisions for minimum usage, 
capping unscheduled operations, and withdrawal for operational need. The rule had a ten year period at 
which time it would sunset.  This rule was due to go into effect October 2009, but was rescinded in May 
2009 (Federal Registry volume 74, page 22714) for JFK and EWR and in October 2009 (Federal Registry 
volume 74, pages 52132) for LGA. 
 
The rule introduced the notion of market-based allocation of slots by proposing that the FAA auction 
10% of slots at EWR and JFK and 15% of the slots at LGA above the 20-slot baseline annually for the 
first 5 years of the rule.  As a result, 96 of the total 1,219 slots at the airport would be auctioned over the 
10-year span of the proposal; between 91 and 179 slots out of 1,245 total slots at JFK would be affected. 
 
Three categories of slots were proposed: Common Slots, Limited Slots and Unrestricted Slots.  Most 
would be Common Slots, which would be leased for ten years and revert to FAA when the rule sunsets.  
Carriers would have property rights to Common Slots, allowing the slots to be collateralized or subleased 
to another carrier for consideration, but Common Slots would revert to FAA under the rule's minimum 
usage provision and could be withdrawn for operational reasons.  Limited Slots would consist only of 
slots operated on a daily, year-round basis, and leases for Limited Slots would also be assigned by 
cooperative agreements between the FAA and carriers.  However, during each of the first 5 years of the 
rule, a percentage of Limited Slots would be made available by auction, at which point they would be 
converted to Unrestricted Slots, which are slots leased directly from FAA under the auction process.   
 
Five official protests were filed on August 14, 2008 by airline carriers. On the same date, a protest 
also was filed by the Air Transport Association.  Two additional protests were filed by the Port Authority 
of New York and New Jersey on August 28, 2008 and another by the New York Aviation Management 
Association (NYAMA) on August 29, 2008. The NYAMA protest was dismissed as the organization is 
not considered a legitimate stakeholder.  
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The protests presented legal arguments contending that the FAA lacks legal authority to conduct the 
slot auction. According to the protesters, the slots are not actual "property," and as such, cannot be subject 
to a lease. According to the protests, the auction transaction involves not a lease, but rather the sale of a 
license by the FAA to a carrier to use a designated flight departure and/or flight landing time. Arguing 
that only a license-rather than a tangible property interest-is involved, the protests maintain that the FAA's 
Property Management Authority does not permit this Auction effort.  The protests also contend that the 
slot auction is not authorized under the FAA's "Airspace Management Authority," which is frequently 
cited as providing the Administrator's management authority over the United States' navigable airspace 
(FAA 2008; pg 5.). 
 
Behind the official protests was an uncertainty on the impact of capacity limits and market-based 
allocation schemes would have on the economies of the regions and the finances of the associated 
enterprises. There were 4 main objections.  
1. Geographic access to air transportation service would be eliminated at some (i.e.  smaller) 
markets 
2. Economic access to air transportation service would be reduced to segments of the 
population. Increased operational costs would lead to increased airfares, to the point where 
segments of the population could no longer afford to fly 
3. Negative financial impact to airlines through additional costs of operation 
4. Failure to improve congestion and reliability for direct service as well as the impact on 
overall National Airspace System (NAS) operations. 
 
In the end, the incumbent airlines reluctantly agreed to setting capacity limits at the three New York 
airports, after sharp debates about how those capacity limits should be set and about how the limited 
capacity would be allocated. Capacity limits at JFK were set at 81 per hour (1/18/2008), and at EWR were 
set at 81 per hour (5/21/2008). The capacity limits at LGA were decreased from 75/hour + 6 unscheduled 
to 71/hour + 3 unscheduled (1/15/2009). No equivalent capacity restrictions were placed on other 
congested airports with similar congestion during peak operations (e.g. Philadelphia, Atlanta). The 























Objective of this Research 
The objective of this research is to inform the policy and, research and technology, decision-makers 
on the concept of better utilization of seat capacity per runway-slot. Specifically, this research answers the 
following questions for each stakeholder in Table 1. 
 
Stakeholder Question 
Congress, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Commerce, and Department of 
Justice as advocates for consumers and the 
U.S. economy 
What happens to geographic access to air 
transportation service by introduction of 
capacity limits at certain highly-congested 
airports? With or without additional operations 
costs (runway access costs), would these 
changes result in an elimination of service at 
smaller markets? 
 
Congress, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Commerce, and Department of 
Justice as advocates for consumers and the 
U.S. economy 
Economic access to air transportation service 
as a result of increased operational costs. 
Would this in turn lead to increases in airfares 
to the point where a segment of the population 
could no longer afford to fly? 
 
Airlines What is the financial impact to airlines when 
airlines incur additional operational costs of 
operation because of additional fees, costs of 
airport usage, or fuel prices? 
 
Congress, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Commerce,  Department of 
Justice as advocates for consumers and the 
U.S. economy, Airlines 
What is the impact on congestion and 
reliability of air service  
Table 1  Research Questions for each of the Stakeholders 
Research Approach 
The Airline Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) was developed to answer questions about how 
airline operating costs, economic conditions and an airlines’ access to an airport impact geographic 
access, economic access, airline finances and congestion and reliability of service. 
 
Two experiments were conducted with the ASOM to determine the impact of airport capacity limits 
and the impact of changes in fuel prices.  The first experiment examined airline strategic decision-making 
in response to the introduction of airport capacity limits for three fixed passenger demand and operating 
costs scenarios (i.e. a given period of time that was described economically by a Gross Domestic Product 
measure and a Hedged Fuel Price cost).  The design of the experiment, summarized in the table below, 
included 45 possible treatments (5 airports X 3 capacity levels X 3 demand and operating cost changes). 
The second experiment examined the effect of fluctuations in fuel prices, passenger demand, and capacity 
limits.  
 
The first experiment is summarized in the factorial design in Table 2.  The design of the experiment 
included 45 possible treatments (5 airports X 3 capacity levels X 3 demand and operating cost conditions. 
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In this experiment airline behavior is evaluated for three airport capacity levels (high, normal, and low) 
for five congested airports (LGA, SFO, EWR, JFK, PHL) for three different economic scenarios: 
 Third quarter 2007 (3QTR07) with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; 
 Third quarter 2008 (3QTR08) with $3.50 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; 
 Third quarter 2009 (3QTR09) with $2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index).   
 
The results provide insights on airline behavior in response to capacity changes for different 
economic scenarios. 
 
Table 2  “Design of Experiment” for ASOM experiment #1. This experiment represents 45 of 45 
possible treatments. 
The second experiment is summarized in the factorial design in Table 3. The design of the experiment 
included 24 possible treatments (1 airports X 3 capacity levels X 4 hedged fuel prices X 2 Gross 
Domestic Product). This experiment examines airline behavior for three airport capacity levels (high, 
normal, and low) and four fuel price levels ($2, $3.5, $5, $8) for one congested airport (EWR) for two 
different economic scenarios: 
 3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index 



































































Low 64 64 72 72 72 64 64 72 72 72 64 64 72 72 72
Normal 72 72 80 80 80 72 72 80 80 80 72 72 80 80 80
High 80 80 96 96 96 80 80 96 96 96 80 80 96 96 96
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The results provide insights on airline behavior in response to capacity changes and fuel price 
changes for different economic scenarios. 
 
Table 3  “Design of Experiment” for Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity Limit experiment.  
Experiment #2 represents 18 of 18 possible treatments. 
It should be noted that, although these experiments include analysis of hedged fuel prices of $5/gallon 
and $8/gallon, historically fuel prices have not exceeded $3.70/gallon (07/2008). The analysis showed 
that the airline decision-making response remained linear throughout the full range of fuel prices allowing 
the use of the data for derivation of the linear regression equations. These results are reported, but it 
should be recognized that above $4/gallon the economy and passenger demand would undergo significant 
changes that have not been experienced (or modeled). See Appendix B for a full discussion. 
Benefits of This Research 
Multiple stakeholders for the US air transportation system can benefit from modeling and 
understanding airline behavior in the presence of economic, regulatory, & technological changes.   
 
Government policy-makers will be provided a quantitative analysis of impact of changes to airline 
scheduling and pricing behavior from changes in economic conditions like Gross Domestic Product and 
fuel prices. The government policy-maker will also be provided insight into how airline scheduling and 
pricing behavior changes with changes in airport capacity limits or with additional fees.  This model built 
on 5 years analysis of historical data will provide the ability to forecast expected airline scheduling and 
pricing behavior for non-historical economic and regulatory scenarios.  
 
Research Managers (e.g. NASA) will be provided insights into impacts of improved technologies 




















Low 72 72 72 72 72 72
Normal 80 80 80 80 80 80
High 96 96 96 96 96 96
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providing airlines the economic incentives to up-gauge.  This research will complement the NextGen 
research, since 49 of 131 NextGen OI’s involved upgrade in aircraft capabilities (Sherry, 2007).  Airline 
up-gauging increases effective-capacity to the system just like the NextGen initiatives do through 
improvements in air traffic flow management, reduced airline separation and more efficient use of current 
TRACON airspaces.  
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2 Functional Model of Airline Strategic Decision-making 
 
Airlines are continuously adjusting their operations in the presence of economic, regulatory, & 
technological changes. Figure 1 provides an abstracted summary of the system under investigation. 
Demographics, social-values, and the economic benefits of rapid, affordable transportation afforded by 
airlines determine the demand for airline operations. Regulatory changes incentivize and curtail 
operations. Technological changes increase productivity and the range and performance of the air 
transportation service. 
    
Figure 1  Airline behavior in the presence of demand, regulatory, and technological changes 
Airlines make the following choices: 
 Markets Served 
 Frequency of Service 
 Flight Schedules 
 Aircraft Size 
 Airfares 
 Congestion and Delays (indirectly) 
 Profit 
These decisions are made in the presence of: 
 National Gross Domestic Product and fuel prices 
 Airport capacity limits 
 Aircraft Performance Capabilities and Operating Costs (Fuel, Labor, Maint, etc)  
 Origin and Destination market demand, revenue, airfare vs demand elasticities  
 
Figure 2 shows a functional representation of airline business planning, scheduling, and operational 
functions and decisions.  The diamonds in the figure represent strategic decisions. The arrows show the 
functions and decision impacted by strategic decisions.   
Airline Behavior in 
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Figure 2  Airline decision-making: Business Planning, Scheduling, and Operations 
The Airline Business Planning function sets airfares based on expected operational costs and 
estimated demand.  Increases in fuel prices affect airlines in their operational costs, thus the airlines 
absorb additional operational costs by trying to increase revenue through increased airfares.   
 
Since demand is related to airfare based upon market price elasticity curves by passenger type, the 
airlines typically cannot recover all additional costs through their fares.   
 
As the figure shows there is a two way relationship between airfare and the airlines’ estimated market 
demand. Demand is also influenced by the national Gross Domestic Product. When the economy is good, 
potential travelers have more disposable income to buy airline tickets.   
 
After the airlines determine the price elasticity and potential demand for the markets, the potential 
revenue and costs can be examined to determine the profitable markets that can be served.   
 
With profitable markets identified, passenger-demand forecasts for these markets coupled with the 
associated operational costs will determine the frequency of service to the market as well as the aircraft 
gauge. The best aircraft available from inventory is selected to meet passenger demand based upon 
individual aircraft performance and fuel prices.   
 
The number of flights per day is determined by the estimated passenger demand and type of 
passenger demand.  Business travelers require more frequent service and are willing to pay for that 
frequency, while leisure passengers will not pay for the more frequent service.   
 


























































Next in this scheduling process, the times for these flights need to be scheduled based upon historic 
patterns in passenger demand, available operating slots (15 min period) at the airport and airport capacity 
limits.  Once these decisions on aircraft type and number of flights per day by time of day are resolved, 
the schedule will reflect all of the markets that will be served.  This schedule and its associated prices are 
announced three to four months prior to service and prices are then altered during the period to account 
for changes in demand and competition.   
23 
3 Method 
This section describes the Airport Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) and the analytical methods 
used in the analysis of the model results. 
3.1 Airport Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) 
The ASOM is a multi-commodity flow model that optimizes the schedule of aircraft serving an 
airport while satisfying market demand. The ASOM, based on an earlier model (Le & Hoffman, 2007) 
selects an optimal schedule for an airport by selecting profitable markets that can be serviced by the 
airport, and then allowing the profitable markets to compete for scheduled flights within the fixed 
capacity of the airport. 
 
The ASOM generates a schedule for a single airline that provides service to all of the eligible markets 
to maximize the profit generated by scheduled operations while meeting the demand.  The parameters of 
the model associated with profit are set such that the ―benevolent‖ single airline: (1) posts prices that are 
consistent with current competitive prices (i.e. it does not seek monopolistic rents) and (2) attempts to 
serve as many markets as it can, while remaining profitable.  
3.1.1 ASOM Overview 
The ASOM is summarized in Figure 3. The inputs to the model are: 
(1) Airport capacity limits for domestic operations. The number of scheduled international flights 
and cargo flight are subtracted from the target airport capacity to obtain the airport capacity 
for domestic operations. 
(2) Feasible flight segments. The list of airports that have historically been served by the target 
airport along with scheduled flight times and aircraft types 
(3) Flights per Day. Daily flights by market represented by sum of quarterly arrivals and 
departures by market.   
(4) International Passenger demand for each time of day. The total passengers traveling on 
domestic segments originate or terminate their domestic travel at one of the airports examined 
in order to connect to or from an international flight segment. 
(5) Market Load Factors 
(6) Aircraft costs. The aircraft is grouped into aircraft fleet classes to determine average segment 
flight times, average fuel burn rates and average costs per flight hour by aircraft class.   
(7) Market demand vs Revenue curves. Demand versus revenue positions or options for each 15 
min time of the day and for the morning (12am-12pm), afternoon (12pm-5pm) and evening 
(5pm-12am) time periods. 
 
The output of the model is a profitable, feasible schedule defined by the following: 
(1) Number of markets served 
(2) Schedule for service to each market defined by Frequency and Time of Day 
(3) Aircraft Size on each scheduled flight 
(4) Airline profits for markets served 
 
The determination of the profitable schedule within the capacity limits of the airport is a two part 
problem. The Sub-problem, determines, for each market, the most profitable schedule that meets market 
demand by selecting the frequency of service and aircraft size based on the value of adding/deleting 
flights in each time period.  These schedules are submitted as inputs to the master problem, this process is 
called Column Generation. 
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The Master-problem then determines an optimal airport schedule by selecting market schedules that 
maximize profit for the benevolent airline within the operational capacity of the airport.  The Dual Prices 
from this solution are submitted to the sub problems, i.e. they provide the information about the relative 
value of having flights added/removed from that time period.  This provides the information back to the 
sub-problem that will determine if it pays to keep the flights at their current times or move them because 
there is ―cheaper‖ capacity at an alternative time.  
 
This process continues until the profit objective function does not improve or there are no new 
schedules generated. 
 Figure 3  Airport Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) 
 
3.1.2 ASOM Scope and Assumptions 
The ASOM generates profitable schedules for non-stop daily domestic markets.  The schedules allow 
only one flight per 15 min to or from each market.  The domestic markets are not static but compete for 
the airport’s capacity. 
 
Aircraft that have historically been used for domestic flights are grouped into fleet classes at 
increments of 25 seats.  For example, aircraft between 88 seats and 112 seats would be in the 100 seat 
fleet class as shown in Table 4.  As this table shows 92.14% of the passengers flown and 81.53% of the 
departures were performed on seven fleet classes for aircraft between 13 and 187 seats.  Since the ASOM 
selects only aircraft for each market’s schedule based on aircraft historically flown to each market, the 
model will be for the most part choosing between these seven fleet classes to determine the most 














































Fleet Class # of Aircraft types seat range % Departures % Passengers 
0 42 <13 5.27% 0.24% 
25 17 13 - 37 16.86% 3.15% 
50 6 38 - 62 41.65% 15.80% 
75 11 63 - 87 50.24% 22.35% 
100 4 88 - 112 51.89% 24.07% 
125 9 113 - 137 76.48% 56.88% 
150 6 138 - 162 92.62% 83.12% 
175 4 163 - 187 98.40% 95.30% 
200  188 - 212 98.40% 95.30% 
225 1 213 - 237 98.79% 96.36% 
250 1 238 - 262 99.53% 98.50% 
275 10 263 - 287 99.96% 99.87% 
300 2 288 - 312 99.97% 99.91% 
325  313 - 337 99.97% 99.91% 
350 1 338 - 362 99.97% 99.91% 
375 1 363 - 387 100.00% 100.00% 
400 1 388 - 412 100.00% 100.00% 
425  413 - 437 100.00% 100.00% 
450 1 438 - 462 100.00% 100.00% 
Table 4  Summary of seat-capacity grouping of aircraft historically used for domestic operations 
Flight demand is not captured at the 15 min level of fidelity, market demand by time of day is 
assumed to be proportionally equal to supply (seats) by time of day. The aircraft selected in the schedule 
is assumed to have a load factor of 80% or better. The airline will need to obtain sufficient revenue to 
have the flight profitable at an 80% load factor, or the optimization will choose a smaller aircraft size or 
move the flight to an alternative time period. The model allows demand to spill into different time slots, 
but restricts demand from moving between morning, afternoon, or evening time periods. This is done by 
nesting demand into 3 periods (12am-12pm, 12pm-5pm and 5pm-12am) to ensure the sum of the 15 
minutes demand does not exceed the demand from the period.   
 
The ASOM assumes that the price/demand data provided in the BTS DB1B database is representative 
and is a good model of the price sensitivity that exists in that market.  
 
When such an airline is ―benevolent‖ it posts prices that are consistent with current competitive prices 
(i.e. it does not seek monopolistic rents) and attempts to serve as many markets as it can, while remaining 
profitable.  The quarterly passenger demand versus airfare relationship is assumed consistent for all days 
and times of day. 
 
The ASOM builds the network of potential flights based on arrivals from the cluster airport to the 
direct non-stop market airport.  The ASOM then assumes a 45 minute turnaround time for all fleets before 
a departure is allowed back to the cluster airport. 
 
Since the databases used do not include all airlines, the ASOM assumes that the data from reporting 






3.2 Data Sources 
This sub-section summarizes the databases that were used as sources for input data for the ASOM. 
 
The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) is a 10% sample of airline tickets from 
reporting carriers collected by the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
Data includes origin, destination and other itinerary details of passengers transported. This database is 
used to determine air traffic patterns, air carrier market shares and passenger flows.  The Survey is 
collected primarily on the basis of a stratified, scientific sample of 10 percent of tickets in all domestic 
and in all international city-pair markets. The Survey data are taken from the selected flight coupons of 
the tickets sampled: single-coupon or double-coupon round trips where the ticket serial number ends in 
zero (0). 
 
The T-100 Domestic Segment database contains domestic non-stop segment data reported by U.S. 
air carriers, including carrier, origin, destination, aircraft type and service class for transported passengers, 
freight and mail, available capacity, scheduled departures, departures performed, aircraft hours, and load 
factor when both origin and destination airports are located within the boundaries of the United States and 
its territories.  
 
The schedule P-52 database contains detailed quarterly aircraft operating expenses for large 
certificated U.S. air carriers. It includes information such as flying expenses (including payroll expenses 
and fuel costs), direct expenses for maintenance of flight equipment, equipment depreciation costs, and 
total operating expenses. 
 
The Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) is an integrated database of air traffic 
operations, airline schedules, operations and delays, weather information, runway information, and related 
statistics.  The ASPM data comes from ARINC’s Out-Off-On-In (OOOI), Enhanced Traffic Management 
System (ETMS), US Department of Transportation’s Aviation Airline Service Quality Performance 
(ASQP) system, weather data, airport arrival and departure rates (15-interval), airport runway 
configurations, and flight cancellations. 
 
The Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) online access system provides detailed data on 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights to and from the ASPM airports (currently there are 77 ASPM 
airports); and all flights by the ASPM carriers (currently 22 carriers), including flights by those carriers to 
international and domestic non-ASPM airports. ASPM also includes airport weather, runway 
configuration, and arrival and departure rates. This combination of data provides a robust picture of air 
traffic activity for these airports and air carriers. Preliminary next-day ASPM data is used by the FAA for 
close monitoring of airport efficiency and other aspects of system performance, and finalized ASPM data 
is invaluable for retrospective trend analysis and targeted studies. 
 
The ASPM database is compiled piece by piece beginning with basic flight plan and other message 
data for flights captured by the Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS), enhanced with next-day 
OOOI data for a key set of airlines, updated with published schedule data, and further updated and 
enhanced with BTS Aviation System Quality and Performance (ASQP) records which include OOOI 
data, final schedule data, and carrier-reported delay causes for the largest U.S. carriers. 
 
ASPM flight records fall into two groupings: Efficiency counts and Metrics counts. ASPM Efficiency 
counts include the full set of ASPM records, including those that are missing one or more pieces of key 
data. In contrast, ASPM Metrics counts only include complete records and records for which accurate 
estimates are possible for the few pieces of missing data. Metrics counts exclude most General Aviation 
and Military flights, as well as records for international flights that only include data associated with the 
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arrival or departure to/from the U.S. airport. Flight cancellations and diversions are excluded from both 
Efficiency and Metrics Counts. The purpose of these two groupings is to allow for a more complete traffic 
count (Efficiency Counts) while ensuring that only records with fully specified flight information are used 
for calculating delay and other metrics. 
 
The Center for Air Transportation Systems Research (CATSR) Databases contains airport time 
zone data needed to develop feasible flight segments and aircraft seat configuration data required to 
assign aircraft to different aircraft classes. 
 
The ASOM input data is preprocessed from several databases as shown in Figure 4.  The inputs for 
the model are preprocessed (1 in figure) from the following databases; the ASPM Individual Daily Flight, 
the T100 monthly flight summaries, the DB1B quarterly passenger itineraries, the P52 quarterly airline 
costs and the CATSR airport and aircraft data databases. 
 
Once preprocessed, the inputs are placed in an access database for the model to read, and then the 
ASOM is run (2). 
 
The outputs are then post-processed (3) to examine trends in markets served, flights per day, average 
aircraft gauge, and airline profit expected with this schedule. 
 
 Figure 4  ASOM inputs are preprocessed from 5 primary data sources  
The BTS and ASPM data was preprocessed for New York, San Francisco and Philadelphia airports 
for the following timeframes: 
 Air Carrier Financial (Schedule P-52):    1QTR07-3QTR09 
 Origin and Destination Survey (DB1BMarket):  1QTR07-3QTR09 
 Air Carriers (T-100 Segment):     Jan 07 – Dec 09 
 Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM):  Jan 07 – Dec 09 
3.2.1 ASOM Preprocessing 
The inputs for the ASOM are; (1) International and Domestic Market Demand, (2) Market flights per 
day, (3) Market load factors, (4) Airport Capacity minus International and Cargo flights, (5) Feasible 






















Figure 5 shows how all of these inputs are preprocessed from the DB1B, T100, ASPM, CATSR and 
P52 databases.  The ASOM control for adjusting airfares for fuel price increases and for airline additional 
fees is performed during preprocessing.  The ASOM control for adjusting segment costs by aircraft class 
for fuel price changes and for landing fee adjustments is performed during preprocessing.  These controls 
are highlighted in green on Figure 5. 
 Figure 5  ASOM Inputs are calculated through SQL and Matlab scripts (in Yellow).  Several 
ASOM controls are adjusted in the preprocessing of the inputs (in Green). 
 
Figure  6  The ASOM model is run through on several software packages in order to preprocess, 
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The ASOM model requires several systems and software to pre-process the data, to run the schedule 
optimization and finally to post-process the output from the model, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
One of the complexities in combining the data into a format usable for the optimization model is the 
fact that the lack of fidelity in most of these data sources require assumptions to made in order to fill these 
data holes.  The red blocks in Table 5 highlight the data holes that need to be filled. 
 
  
Table 5  The ASOM preprocessing fills data holes from the lack of fidelity in available data sources 
(in Red). 
Airport Capacity minus International and Cargo flights is preprocessed from the ASPM database 
by summing the quarterly international and cargo arrivals and departures for every 15 minutes of the day.  
This data is then normalized to represent daily international and cargo arrivals and departures for every 15 
minutes of the day.  The master problem uses this data to adjust daily 15 min capacity available for 
domestic flights. 
 
 Many Cargo flights at an airport are typically flown at night and early morning hours and do not 
compete for the same flight hours as the passenger flights.  For those cargo flights that do compete for 
runway capacity with passenger flights, the runway capacity is adjusted to allow all such cargo flights to 
remain as scheduled.  Therefore, the profitable domestic markets compete for the available capacity that 
remains after international and cargo flights are removed. 
 
The model described is adjusted to account for the effects of international flights and domestic 
passengers connecting to and from international flights on domestic schedules.  The ASOM models only 
domestic markets because international markets are controlled by treaty, are very profitable, and their 
departure and arrival times cannot be changed.  Thus, all flights to international markets are assumed to 
remain.  To assure that there is sufficient runway capacity for these flights, the capacity for each time 
period is reduced by the number of international and cargo flights that will be departing and/or landing in 
that time period.   
QTR Month Daily 15 min Aircraft Market Source
Seats Avg Seats * # Flights = Seat Supply X CATSR
Flights X X X X X X ASPM
Demand X X Demand ~ Seats X X T100
Demand X Extrapolated to T100 demand X DB1B
Revenue X PW Revenue vs Demand ~ Seats X DB1B
Cost X Avg $/hr *Block hrs = 
segment $/market/aircraft
X P52
Block Hrs X X X X X X ASPM
Load Factors X X Avg LFs used X X T100
Intl Flights X X X X X X ASPM




International Market Demand is preprocessed from the restricted DB1B database by summing the 
total passengers traveling on domestic segments originating or terminating their domestic travel at one of 
the airports examined in order to connect to or from an international flight segment.  This quarterly 
demand is then normalized to a daily international demand for all of the domestic markets connecting 
passengers to international markets.  The international arrival and departure banks are determined in 
ASPM to assure that passengers arrive at the airport in sufficient time to connect.  Thus, for example, for 
international flights departing at 5pm, domestic passengers have to arrive at the departing airport by 4pm.  
 
Domestic Market Demand is preprocessed from the T100 database by summing the quarterly 
demand by market.  This is also an input to Matlab to determine the market demand versus revenue 
curves. 
 
Market flights per day are preprocessed from the ASPM database by summing the quarterly arrivals 
and departures by market.  These quarterly flights are then normalized to represent daily flights by 
market.   
 
Market load factors are preprocessed from the T100 database by summing the quarterly demand and 
seats by market.  This quarterly demand is then divided by the quarterly amount of seats flown to provide 
the ASOM load factors for markets flown. 
 
The feasible flight segments are calculated in Matlab by providing airport markets from the T100 
database, airport time zone differentials and aircraft seat sizes from the CATSR database and average 
flight times by aircraft fleet class from the ASPM database.  The aircraft are grouped into aircraft fleet 
classes to determine average segment flight times and feasible aircraft for different markets as an input to 
Matlab’s calculations. The aircraft is assumed to have a 45 min turn around.  So based on this information 
all feasible market and reverse market flight segments are provided to the ASOM. 
 
Matlab creates all possible departure and arrival pairs to the markets from the airport being modeled.  
This includes factoring the turn-around time for these aircraft before they can fly back to the original 
airport. The average block hours for the different markets for all different aircraft which have flown these 
markets are derived from the ASPM database.  Given these average block hours by aircraft class for all 
the markets, Matlab can identify all potential departures and arrivals that can operate at the airport 
modeled between 6am and 10pm.   
 
These feasible flight segments are determined by using Microsoft Access for the non-stop segments 
of the airport or metroplex being analyzed.  This enables the scheduling model to determine optimal 
schedules from feasible roundtrip flights, to ensure the balance of flow of the different aircraft types and 
produce a typical daily schedule. 
 
Market Demand versus Revenue Curves are calculated in Matlab by providing airport quarterly 
market demand from the T100 database, Market demand by segment fare from the DB1B database, and 
seats flown by time of day at 15 minute intervals from the ASPM database.  Matlab provides the ASOM 
piecewise segments from market demand versus revenue curves by time of day at 15 minute intervals and 
for morning (12am-12pm), afternoon (12pm-5pm) and evening (5pm-12am).  This enables the ASOM to 
nest demand into these three periods (12am-12pm, 12pm-5pm and 5pm-12am) to ensure the sum of the 
15 minutes demand does not exceed the demand for the entire period.   
 
Before this data is provided to Matlab DB1B airfares are adjusted to eliminate discount fares and to 
reflect extra airline revenue from bags and change fees, to reflect itinerary taxes and charges which don’t 
go to the airlines, and to provide revenue offsets for fuel price changes. 
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In order to develop these market demand versus revenue curves per flight segment the quarterly 
demand from the DB1B and the monthly demand from the T100 have to be allocated for an average daily 
schedule for each 15 min time of the day.  In order to do this passenger demand is assumed to be 
distributed by time of day proportional to seats flown.  The 10% sample of quarterly demand from the 
DB1B quarterly demand (3 months worth of data) is extrapolated to the T100 level of demand, then the 
demand is divided by the number of days in the quarter to get the average daily demand and is multiplied 
by the percentage of quarterly seats flown in each 15 min period to get the average passenger demand for 
each 15 min period of the day for each market. 
 
From the DB1B data cumulative demand versus airfare curves are approximated for each market.  
Finally piecewise linear segments are created to represent different demand versus revenue positions or 
options for the optimization model to choose from for each 15 min time of the day and for the morning 
(12am-12pm), afternoon (12pm-5pm) and evening (5pm-12am) time periods. 
 
The segment costs by aircraft class are calculated in Matlab by providing airport quarterly cost data 
from the P52 database, aircraft seat sizes from the CATSR database and segment flight times by aircraft 
type from the ASPM database.  The aircraft is grouped into aircraft fleet classes to determine average 
segment flight times, average fuel burn rates and average costs per flight hour by aircraft class.   
 
In order to create the feasible flight arc with associated airline costs to fly these arcs, cost factors are 
developed for aircraft by 25 seat classes (thus aggregating over one hundred different aircraft types into 
less than 15 general classes of aircraft).  All of the flight legs previously determined are costed out for any 
aircraft class which has serviced the market in the past 5 years.  This is done by multiplying the block 
hours by the cost per hour for direct (minus fuel) costs from the P52 database to operate the specific class 
of aircraft.  Fuel costs are determined by multiplying the selected fuel price times the aircraft classes fuel 
burn per hour and then multiplying by the block hours for each market aircraft combination. 
3.2.2 ASOM Control Adjustments in the preprocessing 
Changes in the historical quarter or the airport being examined require all preprocessing to be redone.  
All of the sub problem optimization software files will need to be updated to reflect these changes; these 
files then need to be moved to the server so the ASOM can be rerun to give new results based on the 
changed parameters. 
 
Changes in airfare and revenue from fuel price changes, extra baggage or cancellation fees and from 
taxes and charges the airlines pay through the airfares are made in the DB1B data before being processed 
in Matlab.  These kinds of changes require the market demand versus revenue curves to be recalculated in 
Matlab.  All of the sub problem files will need to be updated to reflect these changes; these files then need 
to be moved to the server so the ASOM can be rerun to give new results based on the changed 
parameters. 
 
Changes in aircraft operational costs from fuel price changes or landing fees are made in the Matlab 
code.  This requires the Matlab network costing function to be rerun to create a new flight segment costs.  
All of the sub problem files will need to be updated to reflect these changes; these files then need to be 
moved to the server so the ASOM can be rerun to give new results based on the changed parameters. 
 
Changes in international and cargo capacity used at the airport are a direct input into the ASOM file.  
The file would then need to be updated on the server and the ASOM can be rerun to give new results 
based on the changed parameters. 
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Lastly changes in airport capacity are done in the master problem’s ―settings‖ file on the server; the 
ASOM can then be rerun to give new results based on the changed parameters. 
 
So changes in some parameters, like airfare, require almost as much work as developing a whole new 
scenario for the model. 
3.2.2.1 Airline Profits - The model for airline profits includes the additional fees that have been 
introduced for domestic air travel and accounts for the landing fees the airlines have to pay.  Before this 
data is provided to Matlab, DB1B airfares are adjusted to eliminate discount fares and to reflect extra 
airline revenue obtained from baggage and change fees.  The total revenue is reduced by removing the 
itinerary taxes and charges which are not part of the airline’s revenue.   The ticket prices are increased 
based on a historical analysis so that as fuel prices increase, revenues will increase in a relative way (see 
Figure 7). 
 
 The model includes a per-passenger average increase in revenue based on the current fees charged 
for baggage, re-scheduling, and in-flight services. The model includes a per-passenger average increase 
for revenue received from belly cargo (freight and mail).  Finally, the ticket/ segment tax and the 
passenger facility charges (PFCs) were removed from the revenue to more accurately reflect the true 
revenue realized by the airlines.   
 
Similarly the operational costs are determined based on the airline costs associated with aircraft 
operations.  These costs include maintenance and fuel-burn costs by aircraft type and distance flown, 
crew costs (also segregated by aircraft type). Landing fees are calculated by aircraft class and added to the 
cost of operations. 
 




– Segment Tax (-$3.60) 1
– PFC (-$3.63) 2
– 911 (-$2.50) 1
• Freight/ Mail (+2.4%) 3
• Fees (+$10.17) 4









Ancillary Fees* 7.50$      10.17$    
Bags 2.09$      3.54$      
Cancel 2.20$      3.08$      
* Bags, Cancel/Change, Pets, Freq Flyer
** Based on 3rd & 4th Quarter




3- Aviation Daily Airline Revenue (4QTR09)
4- BTS Airline Revenue Reports (2008-2009)




Regional Affiliates $5,337 20.2%
Cargo $633 2.4%
Other Revenues $1,964 7.4%
3
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3.2.2.2 ASOM Fuel Price Adjustments - To reflect how airfares change in response to fuel price 
changes, the airfare versus fuel price relationship was examined for the 20 quarters from the first quarter 
of calendar year 2005 (1QTR 2005) to 4 QTR 2009.  A functional relationship was established and used 
in the ASOM model to reflect the airline’s response to changes in fuel price.  This adjustment in airfares 
ensures the changes in fuel prices were accounted for in airline revenue as well as airline costs, since 
airlines change airfares to account for fluctuations in operational costs. 
As shown in Figure 8, the relationship between hedged fuel prices and airfares exhibits two segments. 
The breakpoint between the segments is estimated to occur at $2.50 per gallon.  Two linear relationships 
were calculated for changes in fuel price.  The first relationship was calculated for changes in fuel price 
between $1 and $3.50 per gallon, which adjusts airfare $16.42 for every $1 change in fuel price.  A 
second relationship was calculated for changes in fuel price above $3.50 per gallon, which adjusts airfare 
$8.82 for every $1 change in fuel price. 
 Figure 8  Airfare versus hedged Fuel Price Relationship (2005-2009) 
3.3 ASOM Optimization 
The Airline Optimization Scheduling Model is divided into two parts, a master problem and a 
collection of sub problems for each market pair (as shown previously in Figure 6). The master problem is 
a set packing problem that receives as input multiple alternative schedules for each market pair and 
chooses the overall profit maximizing schedule for the airline as a whole. The sub problems, one per 
market pair, determine an optimized schedule for that market given the dual prices that are provided to it 
from the master problem.  In essence, the master problem indicates the value of adding/deleting one flight 
from a given time period.  The sub problems use this information to determine if it there is an alternative 
schedule for flights to that market that would improve the overall profitability of the airline. The sub 
problems are multi-commodity flow problems that determine both when to fly and on what size aircraft.   
 
Each sub problem (one per market) generates the most profitable schedule given dual prices that are 
fed to it from the master problem.  An output from a run of the sub problem optimization is either a new 
schedule that is guaranteed to increase the objective function of the master problem, or an indicator that 
no such schedule exists.  
 
y = 16.421x + 141.62
R² = 0.8312



















$1 in Fuel Price = 
$8.82 in Airfare
$1 in Fuel Price = 
$16.42 in Airfare
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Given a set of new schedules obtained from the sub problems, the master problem takes these new 
schedules along with all other schedules previously generated and determines a new overall schedule that 
considers all markets simultaneously and optimizes the profitability of the benevolent operator.  The 
process is iterative: the solution to the master problem provides new dual prices that are then fed to the 
sub problems and the sub problems provide alternative individual market schedules to the master 
problem.  The process continues until either the objective function of the master problem is not improved 
or none of the sub problems produce new schedules.  At this point, the algorithm has solved the linear 
programming relaxation of the master problem.  However, if the solution obtained is not integer, then one 
must begin a branch-and-bound search tree in order to obtain an integer solution.  It also outputs new dual 
prices based on that schedule, and once again return to the sub problems procedure with these new dual 
prices.  
 
This procedure continues until either the master problem doesn’t generate improved schedule from 
the previous one or there is no new schedule generated from any of the sub problem.  When either of 
these conditions is met, the model then begins a branch-and-bound search tree approach to assure that the 
solution obtained to the Master Problem is integer.  Thus, on each node of the branching tree, steps 1 and 
2 are repeated.  This process continues until the entire branching tree is fathomed. 
3.3.1 ASOM Master Problem 
The master problem is presented in the Figure 9. The objective function maximizes total profit for the 
airport’s schedule.  Notation is as follows: 
 
Zj = Profit from schedule j 
yj = Decision variable (0,1) on whether schedule j is selected 
aij = Decision variable (0,1) on arrival for time i and schedule j 
dij = Decision variable (0,1) on departure for time i and schedule j 
Ij = average number of international or cargo arrivals (a) or departures (d) for time i 
= Set of 15 minute time windows in the day 
= Set of schedules submitted to master problem from sub problems 
(m) = Set of schedules for market m 
= Set of possible markets for schedule
 
Constraints 1 and 2 ensure that there are no more flights in a single 15-minute bin than the arrival and 
departure capacity available to handle these flights, respectively. Capacity is defined to be airport capacity 
minus the portion of that capacity used by other flights.  Other flights refer to the capacity reserved for the 
international and freight flights, since the model optimizes only domestic air travel.  Constraint 3 
guarantees that at most only one schedule per market pair is chosen. 
 
Figure 9  ASOM Master Problem 
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3.3.2 ASOM Sub-Problem 
The sub problem is presented in the Figure 10. The objective function maximizes total profit for the 
markets schedule from the airport.  Notation is as follows: 
 
Riq = Linear segment revenue for time i and segment q 
iq = Decision variable (0,1) for time i and segment q 
Ckij = Direct operating cost for one flight of fleet type k for flight arc (i,j) 
xkij = Decision variable (0,1) for one flight of fleet type k for flight arc (i,j) 
l = average load factor 
Sk = Seats for aircraft of fleet type k 
Aiq = Linear segment passenger demand for time i and segment q 
Apr = Linear segment passenger demand for period r and segment p 
Rpr = Linear segment revenue for period r and segment p 
pr = Decision variable (0,1) for period r and segment p 
= Set of 15 minute time windows in the day 
= Set of periods in the day 
= Set of aircraft fleet classes 
 
Figure 10  ASOM sub-problem 
 
 
The sub problem consists of an objective function and 13 constraints.  
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Constraint 4 creates flow balance constraints that assure that, for each fleet type, there is an equal 
number of incoming and outgoing aircraft of that type.  It also assures that an aircraft must arrive before it 
can depart and it must remain of the same type.  
 
Constraint 5 assures that there is sufficient supply for the demand, that the aircraft size can 
accommodate the demand, and that the aircraft does not fly less than 80% full.   
 
Constraint 6 requires that the demand per period be satisfied.  
 
Constraint 7 assures that the airline does not fly any flights that are unprofitable.  This does the same 
for revenue. This is to ensure that even though there is no flight at some time window despite there being 
demand for it, the demand is still satisfied in the consecutive time window and passengers are not 
removed from that time period.  
 
Constraint set 8 requires the number of flights into a market is approximately equal to the number of 
flights out of a market (can differ by no more than one).  
 
Constraint 9 ensures that international passenger demand that is connecting from domestic markets is 
satisfied.  Therefore, we will not eliminate a profitable market which connects domestic passengers to 
international flights. 
 
Constraints 10 and 11 ensure that there is only one flight between the market pair in the same time 
window.   
 
Constraint 12 and 13 ensures that only one segment of the piecewise linear approximation for the 
revenue curve is chosen for each time window and period respectively.  The piecewise linear 
approximation works here because the optimization model is maximizing profit and the revenue versus 
demand curve approximations are convex. 
3.3.3 ASOM Post-Processing 
There are two text files created by the model for each run.  A sample log file, shown in Figure 11, 
illustrates the number of markets or sub problems initiated for the model.  This file also identifies the 
number of these initial markets that are profitable.  This file shows the number of iterations back and forth 
between Main and Sub-problems.  Lastly, the expected profit from the final airport’s schedule is shown. 
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 Figure 11  ASOM Log File 
 
The second output file is the schedule file, Figure 12.  This file shows all of the individual flights on the 
airport’s final schedule.  For each flight or row of data the market served, the size of aircraft, the 
departure time, the arrival time and the frequency is shown. 
 
Figure 12  ASOM schedule file 
   
init_problems():91 markets. (initial markets)
add ABE_0_1 ,z = 14580.140000000003 cost = 13142.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 300.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=14580.139000000003
……….
add TYS_0_64 ,z = 1186.4142857142815 cost = 14124.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 150.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=1186.4132857142815
Generate columns – 64 Profitable Markets
add ABE_1_65 ,z = 14580.139999999994 cost = 13142.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 300.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=14530.138999999994
……….
add TYS_1_128 ,z = 1186.4142857142838 cost = 14124.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 150.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=1136.4132857142838
generate_columns() ended with 128columns in master_vars
generate_columns() ended with 64 columns generated at the current node.
Generate columns
add ABE_2_129 ,z = 14580.139999999996 cost = 13142.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 300.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=2910.1389999999956
……..
add STL_6_311 ,z = 8221.784615384611 cost = 99270.0, frequency = 10.0(10), throughput= 750.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=428.78361538461104
add TPA_6_312 ,z = 312182.0929837098 cost = -5.3657078780133816E-12, frequency = 10.0(10), throughput= 2750.0, gap=0.0, reduced 
cost =312132.09198370983
generate_columns() ended with 312columns in master_vars
Total profit: 6743454.0
Market Size Dep Time Arr Time Freq
ABE 6 76 178 1.0
ABE 6 176 86 1.0
ACK 2 39 143 1.0
ACK 2 123 35 1.0
……
TYS 3 73 180 1.0
TYS 3 152 67 1.0
Market Fleet size i j freq local time seats year qtr airport cap fp dist ASM
ABE 6 76 178 1 76 150 2009 3 EWR 9 8 67 10050
ABE 6 176 86 1 86 150 2009 3 EWR 9 8 67 10050
ACK 2 39 143 1 39 50 2009 3 EWR 9 8 218 10900
ACK 2 123 35 1 35 50 2009 3 EWR 9 8 218 10900
ALB 3 26 130 1 26 75 2009 3 EWR 9 8 143 10725






Row Labels Sum of ASM Sum of seats Sum of freq Average Size
ATL 6518750 8750 42
Grand Total 99574150 94350 628 150.24           
 38 
The aircraft sizes are grouped into classes in 25 seat intervals, so to determine the class you multiply 
the size by 25 seats, for example the first row identifies a size 6*25 = 150 seat aircraft.   
 
The departure and arrival times are shown in 15 min intervals starting with 1 or 12:15am.  The arrival 
or departure time which is less than 96 (there are 96 15-minute intervals in a 24-hour day) determines 
whether this is an arrival or departure from our airport modeled.  To determine the arrival or departure 
time at the other airport subtract 96 from its number.  For example the first row shows a departure from 
our airport to ABE at 76 (1900 hrs or 7:00pm) and this flight arrives at ABE at 178-96 = 82 (2030hrs or 
8:30pm ABE local time).  All times reported in the schedule are local times. 
 
This schedule data from ASOM can be copied into a spreadsheet program to generate charts and 
tables and compare different scenarios based on different input parameters. 
3.3.4 ASOM Limitations and Consistency Check 
The ASOM models exhibits the following limitations: 
1. The ASOM model considers airline scheduling decision strictly based on operational 
profitability rather than any decisions that are made for strategic positioning.  It does not 
model airline competition, except as it uses pricing curves that are based on competitive 
behavior.   
2. The ASOM models chooses only profitable markets to serve and does not consider staying in 
unprofitable markets during down economic times in order to retain market share.  Thus, the 
model is likely to move out of markets more quickly than might actually occur during 
recessionary periods. 
3. The ASOM models a single airline serving these profitable markets, which finds the optimal 
schedule minus airline competition.  For the analysis of EWR and SFO (hubs for large 
carriers), this assumption may be closer to actual behavior than at airports such as LGA 
where there is significant competition at the airport.  
4. The ASOM models balanced arrivals and departures and does not model the advantages of 
banking (i.e. having many incoming flights during one period that would allow passengers to 
connect to other flights during the next few periods).    
5. The model also tries to satisfy the demand based on historic data. Thus, it does not allow 
demand from the morning to spill into the afternoon. 
6. Currently the ASOM models airline adjustments from increases in hedged fuel prices by 
uniformly increasing all airfares.  This methodology does not account for possible changes in 
passenger demand due to economic outcomes from fuel price changes.  Additionally this 
methodology does not account for any price passenger elasticity changes due to  economic 
outcomes from fuel price changes. 
 
In the presence of these limitations a tiered level of consistency checks on the ASOM can be 
performed to obtain a level of confidence in the results of the model. 
 
Tier 1:  The first consistency check compares ASOM results to the historic behavior of the airlines 
serving these five congested airports (LGA, EWR, JFK, SFO, PHL) for three different economic 
scenarios: 3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; 3QTR08 with $3.5 fuel prices and 105 GDP 
index; and 3QTR09 with $2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.   This analysis determines the percent of 
observations within 15% of the historic data, since the ASOM schedule is expected to be more efficient. 
 
Tier 2: The second consistency check compares annual changes in ASOM results to the annual 
changes in historic behavior of the airlines serving these five congested airports (LGA, EWR, JFK, SFO, 
PHL) for two annual changes (3QTR07 to 3QTR08, and 3QTR08 to 3QTR09).  This analysis determines 
the percent of annual trends within 10% of the historic trends. 
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Tier 3: A third consistency check compares the opposite market schedules generated from the ASOM.  
For example the ASOM schedule for LGA will contain the LGA-PHL market and the ASOM schedule 
for PHL will contain the PHL-LGA market. These opposite markets will be compared for consistency. 
 
Tier 4: Lastly the statistical relationships found in the historic data and ASOM analysis between the 
exogenous factors and the economic access, geographic access and airline profitability factors will be 
compared.  Basically it’s important to see if the ASOM models similar trends and behaviors as seen in the 
historical data.  But even comparing historical trends is difficult since the confounding factors from the 
historical trends cannot be removed. 
 
The results of the 4 tier analysis are provided in Appendix A. 
3.4 Method for Statistical Analysis of ASOM outputs 
The ASOM outputs analyzed include: (1) the number of profitable markets served, (2) the daily 
domestic flights by market, (3) aircraft class and time of day, and (4) the airline profits for the airport 
examined.  The controls or exogenous factors for the model are fuel prices, airport capacity limits and 
historical gross domestic product. 
 
The analysis of statistically significant trends between the exogenous factors and the ASOM outputs 
required the following multi-step process: 
(1) The ASOM output data was processed into the metrics of interest at the airport level. 
(2) A correlation analysis of factors was done to identify the individual relationships between 
factors.  The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient is used to measure the degree of 
linear relationship between two variables. The correlation coefficient assumes a value 
between -1 and +1. If one variable tends to increase as the other decreases, the correlation 
coefficient is negative. Conversely, if the two variables tend to increase together the 
correlation coefficient is positive. For a two-tailed test of the correlation: 
H0: r = 0  versus  H1: r ≠ 0   where r is the correlation between a pair of variables. 
(3) Next a step-wise regression was performed to identify the factors that most impact the 
independent variable.  Thus, stepwise regression adds variables sequentially, choosing the 
most significant variable first and continues until the adding of another variable degrades the 
relative R2 coefficient (i.e. the R2 adjusted for the number of independent terms in the 
regression equation.  
 
(4) Then these separate individual regression model results were aggregated to develop a picture 
of the statistically significant relationships between the exogenous factors, the airline 
scheduling and pricing behavior, and the impacts of these behaviors on airport congestion and 
airline profitability. 
 
3.5 Scope and Design of Experiment 
Two experiments were conducted with the ASOM to determine the impact of airport capacity limits 
and the impact of change in fuel prices.  The ASOM first examined what happens when airport capacity 
limits are changed with fixed passenger demand (representing gross domestic product) and fuel prices.  
Next the ASOM examines what happens when fuel prices are changed with fixed passenger demand 




3.5.1 Experiment #1 
Experiment #1, summarized in the factorial design in Table 6, examined airline schedule behavior by 
tracking (a) aircraft size, (b) flights per day, and (c) daily markets served.  It also tracks (d) profitability of 
the airlines servicing the airports. 
 
Experiment #1 examines airline behavior for three airport capacity levels (high, normal, and low) for 
five congested airports (LGA, SFO, EWR, JFK, PHL) for three different economic scenarios: (1) 
3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices; (2) 3QTR08 with $3.50 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; and (3) 3QTR09 
with $2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.  The results provide insights on airline behavior in response to 
capacity changes for different economic scenarios. 
 
Table 6  “Design of Experiment” for ASOM experiment #1. This experiment represents 45 of 45 
possible treatments. 
3.5.2 Experiment #2 
The second ASOM experiment, summarized in the factorial design in Table 7, examined airline 
schedule behavior by tracking (a) aircraft size, (b) flights per day, and (c) daily markets served.  It also 
tracks (d) profitability of the airlines servicing the airports. 
 
Experiment #2 examines airline behavior for three airport capacity levels (high, normal, and low) and 
four fuel price levels ($2, $3.5, $5, $8) for one congested airport (EWR) for two different economic 
scenarios: (1) 3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index, and (2) 3QTR09 with $2 fuel prices and 
103 GDP index.  The results provide insights on airline behavior in response to capacity changes and fuel 


































































Low 64 64 72 72 72 64 64 72 72 72 64 64 72 72 72
Normal 72 72 80 80 80 72 72 80 80 80 72 72 80 80 80
High 80 80 96 96 96 80 80 96 96 96 80 80 96 96 96
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Table 7  “Design of Experiment” for hedged fuel price and capacity limit experiment.  Experiment 
#2 represents 18 of 18 possible treatments. 
Limitation of Design of Experiments 
Note: These experiments include analysis of hedged fuel prices of $5/gallon and $8/gallon. 
Historically, fuel prices have not exceeded $3.70/gallon (this highest price happened in July of 2008). The 
analysis showed that the airline decision-making response remained linear throughout the full range of 
fuel prices allowing the use of the data for derivation of the linear regression equations. These results are 
reported, but it should be recognized that above $4/gallon the economy and passenger demand would 


























Low 72 72 72 72 72 72
Normal 80 80 80 80 80 80
High 96 96 96 96 96 96
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4 Results 
This section describes the results of the analyses of the Experiments conducted using the ASOM. 
Section 4.1 examines the results of Experiment #1: the impact of Airport Capacity Limits. Section 4.2 
examines the results of Experiment #2: the impact of Fuel Prices Changes and Capacity Limits. Section 
4.3 describes the relationship between parameters from a regression analysis. The results of the validation 
tests on the ASOM model are included in Appendix A.  
 
The results of the ASOM experiments indicate the following effects: 
 
Geographic Access: 
i. Markets served per day reduce slightly as capacity limits are reduced, gross domestic product is 
reduced, or hedged fuel prices are increased 
ii. Flights per day are reduced as capacity limits are reduced, gross domestic product is reduced, or 
fuel prices are increased 
 
Air Transportation Efficiency: 




iv. Airline Profits increase as hedged fuel prices, gross domestic product, aircraft size, or flights per 
day increase 
4.1 Experiment #1 Results: ASOM Capacity Variation Results 3QTR (2007-2009) 
(LGA, EWR, JFK, SFO, PHL) 
In this experiment the ASOM examines airline behavior for different airport capacity levels (high, 
normal, and low) for five different congested airports (LGA, EWR, JFK, SFO, and LGA) for three 
different economic scenarios: (1) 3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; (2) 3QTR08 with $3.5 
fuel prices and 105 GDP index; and (3) 3QTR09 with $2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.  The results 
provide insights on airline behavior in response to capacity changes for different economic scenarios. 
4.1.1  Geographic Access 
This section describes the results for profitable markets, scheduled flights per day and aircraft size 
4.1.1.1 Profitable Markets - The results of ASOM analysis of the profitable markets (NY, SF, and 
Philadelphia) is shown in Table 8.  This table shows the Baseline Direct service Markets for ―Normal‖ 
Capacity Limits (in Black). The remaining cells in the table show the change in Direct service Markets 
from this baseline.  The results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect on 
profitable markets served.  The analysis shows that most profitable markets can still be served for the five 
congested airports examined, even when airport capacity is reduced to 10% below current operations.  
When capacity at these airports is increased, as anticipated with NextGen, ASOM fits a few more current 
profitable markets into the schedule.   
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Table 8  Sensitivity of Direct service Markets to Capacity Limits.   
When Airport Capacity Limits are reduced through fixed passenger demand (represented by gross 
domestic product) and fuel prices, the number of profitable markets served does not change.   
 
The results of a linear regression for markets served by the five airports, over 3 years, and for 3 
airport capacity limits provides insights into the correlations between the variables and the significant 
factors that influence airline decisions on markets served (Table 9). 
 
Table 9  Correlation of significant factors that influence airline decisions on markets served. 
The closer the Pearson correlation coefficient is to +1 or -1 the greater the positive or negative 
correlation (or relationship) is between the factors. 
 
A P-value of .05 or less means that there is 95% confidence in the statistical correlation. 
The analysis shows correlation between markets Served and airport capacity limits.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified the profitable Markets to be a function of airport capacity 
limits.  This relationship was found to be positive. The correlation accounted for 8.8% (i.e. R-squared) of 
the observed variation in profitable markets served. The remaining effects are inter-airline competition, 
changes in airline business models, and airline restructuring when emerging from bankruptcy.  The 
regression equation for profitable markets served by the airlines is as follows: 
Markets = 26.2 + 0.441 Caps  






L - -1 -2 -4 -4
N 59 52 79 49 80






L -1 - -1 -3 -2
N 59 39 64 49 74






L - -5 -1 -2 -2
N 60 44 73 54 83
H - +2 +2 - +2
Fuel Prices GDP Caps
Markets
Pearson
correlation -0.199 -0.101 0.329
P-Value 0.189 0.51 0.027
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4.1.1.2 Scheduled Flights per Day 
The results of ASOM analysis of the scheduled flights per day at the Metroplex (NY, SF, and 
Philadelphia) is shown in Table 10.  The table shows the Baseline Scheduled flights per day for ―Normal‖ 
Capacity Limits (in Black). The remaining cells in the table show the change in Scheduled flights per day 
from this baseline.  These results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect 
on scheduled flights per day.  The analysis shows that most of the flights per day for normal capacity 
limits are still scheduled, even when airport capacity is reduced to 10% below current levels.  When 
capacity is increased, as anticipated with NextGen, ASOM fits a few more scheduled flights per day into 
the schedule.   
 
Table 10  Sensitivity of Scheduled flights per day to Capacity Limits.  
When airport capacity limits are reduced with passenger demand (representing gross domestic 
product) and fuel prices fixed airlines will reduce the total number of flights.  This is expected since the 
number of operations allowed per hour is reduced.  These trends are consistent for all five airports for a 
booming economy in the third quarter 2007, a slowed economy in the third quarter 2008, and during the 
recession in the third quarter 2009.  And profitable schedules were found for all three quarters for all five 
airports examined, even in the third quarter 2009 when most airlines were reporting significant losses.  
 
Figure 13 shows how the average daily flights for 3QTR (2007-2008) for all five airports (LGA, 
EWR, JFK, SFO, PHL) change as airport capacity limits are increased or reduced in comparison to the 
historic schedule. This analysis shows the proportion of historic non-profitable flights that were not 
scheduled by the ASOM.  This figure also shows how the ASOM scheduled flights per day were reduced 
as the airport capacity limits were reduced.  






L -50 -28 -50 -64 -38
N 834 634 750 630 876






L -18 -12 -38 -28 -32
N 718 596 644 558 798






L -46 -68 -34 -58 -50
N 810 710 704 670 888
H +22 +32 +16 +32 +72
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 Figure 13   ASOM Flight Schedules slightly reduce as Airport Capacity Limits are reduced  
 
The results of a linear regression for scheduled flights per day by the airports at each of the five 
airports, over three years and for three airport capacity limits provides insights into the correlations 
between the variables and the significant factors that influence airline decisions on scheduled flights per 
day (Table 11). 
 
Table 11  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between scheduled 
flights per day and hedged fuel prices. 
 
The analysis shows correlation between scheduled flights per day and fuel price.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified the scheduled flights per day to be a function of airport 
capacity limits and fuel price.  This relationship was found to be positive for airport capacity limits and 
negative for fuel price. The correlation accounted for 17.4% (i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in 
scheduled flights per day. The remaining effects are inter-airline competition, changes in airline business 
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models, and airline restructuring when emerging from bankruptcy.  The regression equation for scheduled 
flights per day to all markets served by the airlines is as follows: 
 
Flights per Day = 639 + 2.78 Caps - 55.3 fuel price 
4.1.2  Airline Profits 
The results of ASOM analysis of the airline profits (NY, SF, and Philadelphia) are shown in Table 12.  
This table shows the Baseline Airline Profits per day for ―Normal‖ Capacity Limits (in Black).   The 
remaining cells in the table show the change in Airline Profits per day from this baseline.  The results 
show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little to no effect on airline profits.  When 
more capacity is available, as anticipated with NextGen, ASOM shows airlines would add marginally 
profitable flights to their schedule.  
  
Table 12  Sensitivity of Airline Profits to Capacity Limits.   
When airport capacity limits are reduced with fixed passenger demand (representing gross domestic 
product) and fuel prices, airlines will adjust operations to maintain profits (dropping the least profitable 
flights). These trends are consistent for 87% (13/15) of cases examined across five airports for a booming 
economy in the third quarter 2007, a slowed economy in the third quarter 2008, and during the recession 
in the third quarter 2009. And profitable schedules were found for all three quarters for all five airports 
examined, even in the third quarter 2009 when most airlines were reporting significant losses. When 
examining JFK for third quarter 2007, a 25% reduction in capacity limits reduces the airlines profit by 
21%. One explanation is that JFK’s schedule for third quarter 2007 was significantly peaked. As the 
peaks were removed the profit was also removed. 
 
The results of a linear regression for airline profits at each of the five airports, over three years and for 
three airport capacity limits provides insights into the correlations between the variables and the 
significant factors that influence airline profit (Table 13). 






L -$.106 -$.108 -$.110 -$.923 -$.115
N $4.087 $5.624 $5.884 $4.748 $3.477






L -$.027 -$.037 -$.224 -$.059 -$.057
N $3.205 $3.746 $5.347 $4.089 $2.679






L -$.078 -$.019 -$.269 -$.514 -$.113
N $3.938 $3.358 $4.783 $4.667 $3.406
H +$.030 +$.012 +$.059 +$.099 +$.156
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Table 13  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between airline profits 
and scheduled flights per day and aircraft size. 
The analysis shows correlation between airline profit to scheduled flights per day and aircraft size.   
 
However, the stepwise regression found airline profit correlated with fuel price, gross domestic 
product, markets served and aircraft size.  This relationship was found to be positive for gross domestic 
product, markets served and aircraft size and negative for fuel price. The correlation accounted for 62.0% 
(i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in airline profit. The remaining effects are inter-airline 
competition, changes in airline business models, and airline restructuring when emerging from 
bankruptcy.  The regression equation for airline daily profits for service in and out of the airport is as 
follows: 
Daily Airline Profit = - 21.8 - 0.658 fuel price + 0.229 GDP + 0.0156 Markets + 0.0271 Guage 
4.1.3 Air Transportation Efficiency.  
4.1.3.1 Aircraft Size - The results of ASOM analysis of the average aircraft gauge (NY, SF, and 
Philadelphia) is shown in Table 14.  This table shows the Baseline average Aircraft Gauge for ―Normal‖ 
Capacity Limits (in Black). The remaining cells in the table show the change in average Aircraft Gauge 
from this baseline.  The results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect on 
aircraft gauge.  When more capacity is available, as anticipated with Nextgen, ASOM shows airlines 
would down-gauge and thus not realize the full benefits from Nextgen.   







correlation -0.254 0.068 0.184 0.012 -0.339 0.654
P-Value 0.093 0.658 0.225 0.939 0.023 0
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Table 14  Sensitivity of average Aircraft Gauge to Capacity Limits.  
When airport capacity limits are reduced with passenger demand (representing gross domestic 
product) and fuel prices fixed, we find that airlines will slightly up-gauge.  This is expected since the 
number of operations allowed per hour is reduced and the same demand must be serviced. These trends 
are consistent for 93% (14/15) of cases examined across five airports for a booming economy in the third 
quarter 2007, a slowed economy in the third quarter 2008, and during the recession in the third quarter 
2009.  Also, profitable schedules were found for all three quarters for all five airports examined, even in 
the third quarter 2009 when most airlines were reporting significant losses. For JFK third quarter 2009, 
the optimal schedule down-gauges as capacity is reduced, but under alternate demand circumstance (.e.g. 
3 Qtr 2007 and 3 QTR 2008) the optimal schedule up up-gauged. This could reflect the fact that 
historically when JFK’s capacity limits were reduced the airlines de-peaked the schedule and maintained 
the number of flights. 
 
Figure 14 shows the how the average daily flights for 3QTR (2007-2008) for all five airports (LGA, 
EWR, JFK, SFO, PHL) change as airport capacity limits are increased or reduced.  This figure also shows 
how the ASOM does not significantly change the size of the aircraft as a function of airport capacity 
limits.  






L +1 +4 +5 +3 -1 
N 78 113 139 127 79 






L - -1 +4 +2 -
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L +1 +4 - -5 +2
N 81 115 110 102 71 
H -2 - -4 - -1
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 Figure 14   ASOM average Aircraft Gauge insensitive to Capacity Limits  
The results of a linear regression for aircraft size for the airports at each of the five airports, over three 
years and for three airport capacity limits provides insights into the correlations between the variables and 
the significant factors that influence airline decisions on aircraft size (Table 15). 
 
Table 15  Table shows no statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between average 
Aircraft Gauge and exogenous factors. 
The analysis shows no correlation between aircraft gauge and fuel price, gross national product, or 
capacity limits.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified no functional relationship between aircraft gauge and fuel 
price, gross national product, or capacity limits.   
 
These results from the ASOM model were not surprising because of the lack of economies of scale 
related to up-gauging.  A closer examination of the data shows that 100 and 200 seat class aircraft have 






































correlation 0.159 0.236 0.051
P-Value 0.298 0.119 0.741
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jets that are more fuel efficient that the larger aircraft in the overall fleet.  As fuel prices increase, there is 
more incentive for the ASOM to move to smaller aircraft.  Figure 15 illustrates this point, showing how 
the smaller aircraft have better average cost per seat hour.  The B787 and A380 are more efficient aircraft 
but unlikely to be used for many of the markets currently served by these airports since they are relatively 
large aircraft. 
 
By using smaller aircraft the airlines can assure high load factors, and greater flight frequency.  This 
result has significant implications for future airspace use. 
 
Figure 15 Poor aircraft performance ($/seat-hr) in 100- and 200-seat aircraft classes 
4.2 Experiment #2: ASOM Capacity and Fuel Price Variation Results  
In this experiment the ASOM examines airline behavior for different airport capacity levels (high, 
normal, and low) and for different fuel price levels ($2, $3.5, $5) for one congested airport (EWR) for two 
different economic scenarios (3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index, and 3QTR09 with $2 fuel 
prices and 103 GDP index).  The results provide insights on airline behavior in response to capacity 
changes and fuel price changes for different economic scenarios. 
4.2.1 Geographic Access 




























4.2.1.1 Profitable Markets - The results of ASOM analysis of the profitable markets for EWR are shown 
in Table 16.  This table shows the Baseline (underlined) Direct service Markets for ―Normal‖ Capacity 
Limits (i.e. 80 operations/hour), and passenger demand at $2.08/gallon and $1.92/gallon. The remaining 
cells in the table show the change in Direct service Markets from this baseline. When hedged fuel prices 
approach $5 the target airport starts to lose Direct service Markets (yellow).  The results show that 
adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect on profitable markets served. However, 
significant increases in fuel prices reduced the number of markets served.  In the table the underlined 
quantity represents the baseline ASOM results for markets served for normal capacity limits and fuel 
prices in line with historic prices for the quarter examined.  When more capacity is available, as 
anticipated with NextGen, ASOM fits a few more current profitable markets into the schedule.   
 
Table 16  Sensitivity of EWR Direct service Markets to Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity Limits.  
The results of a linear regression for markets served by EWR over two years, for three airport 
capacity limits and for four different fuel prices provides insights into the correlations between the 
variables and the significant factors that influence airline decisions on markets served (Table 17). 
 
Table 17  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between direct service 
markets and hedged fuel prices and Gross Domestic Product. 
The analysis shows correlation between markets Served to fuel prices and Gross Domestic Product.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified the profitable markets to be a function of capacity limits, 
fuel prices and GDP.  This relationship was found to be positive for capacity limits and GDP, and 
negative for fuel prices. The correlation accounted for 83.4% (i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in 
profitable markets served. The remaining effects are inter-airline competition, changes in airline business 
Fuel Prices GDP Caps
Markets
Pearson
correlation -0.505 0.515 0.376
P-Value 0.033 0.029 0.124
EWR 
Markets





L -2 -1 -8
N 79 -1 -9





L +1 -1 -5
N 74 +1 -1
H - +1 -
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models, and airline restructuring when emerging from bankruptcy.  The regression equation for profitable 
markets served by the airlines is as follows: 
 
Markets = - 98.4 + 0.122 Caps + 1.61 GDP - 1.36 Fuel  Price 
4.2.1.2 Scheduled Flights per Day - The results of ASOM analysis of the scheduled flights per day for 
EWR are shown in Table 18.  This table shows the Baseline (underlined) scheduled flights per day for 
―Normal‖ Capacity Limits (i.e. 80 operations/hour), and passenger demand at $2.08/gallon and 
$1.92/gallon. The remaining cells in the table show the change in scheduled flights per day from this 
baseline. When hedged fuel prices approach $5 the scheduled flights per day significantly reduce 
(yellow).  The results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect on 
scheduled flights per day, but significant increases in fuel prices reduce the number of scheduled flights 
per day.  In the table the underlined quantity represents the baseline ASOM results for scheduled flights 
per day for normal capacity limits and fuel prices in line with historic prices for the quarter examined.  
When more capacity is available, as anticipated with Nextgen, ASOM fits a few more flights into the 
schedule.   
 
Table 18  Sensitivity of EWR scheduled flights per day to Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity Limits.  
These fuel price trends are consistent for all three capacities for a booming economy in the third 
quarter 2007 and during the recession in the third quarter 2009.  Profitable schedules were found for both 
quarters examined, even in the third quarter 2009 when most airlines were reporting significant losses. 
 
The results of a linear regression for scheduled flights for EWR over two years, for three airport 
capacity limits and for four different fuel prices provides insights into the correlations between the 
variables and the significant factors that influence airline decisions on markets served (Table 19). 
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P-Value 0.008 0.071 0.016
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L -34 -56 -92
N 672 -16 -54
H +16 +14 -30
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Table 19  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between scheduled 
flights per day and Hedged Fuel Prices and airport capacity limits. 
The analysis shows correlation between markets served to fuel prices and capacity limits.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified the scheduled flights per day to be a function of capacity 
limits, fuel prices and GDP.  This relationship was found to be positive for capacity limits and GDP, and 
negative for fuel prices. The correlation accounted for 88.2% (i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in 
profitable markets served. The remaining effects are inter-airline competition, changes in airline business 
models, and airline restructuring when emerging from bankruptcy.  The regression equation for daily 
scheduled flights is as follows: 
Flights = - 1392 + 2.48 Caps + 18.9 GDP - 22.3 Fuel  Price 
 
4.2.2 Airline Profits 
The results of ASOM analysis of airline profit for EWR are shown in Table 20.  This table shows the 
Baseline (underlined) Airline Profit for ―Normal‖ Capacity Limits (i.e. 80 operations/hour), and 
passenger demand at $2.08/gallon and $1.92/gallon. The remaining cells in the table show the change in 
Airline Profit from this baseline. When hedged fuel prices exceed $3.50 the airline profit significantly 
increases (yellow).  The results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect on 
airline profit, but significant increases in fuel prices increase airline profit.  In the table the underlined 
quantity represents the baseline ASOM results for airline profit for normal capacity limits and fuel prices 
in line with historic prices for the quarter examined. 
 
Table 20  Sensitivity of EWR Airline Profit to Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity Limits.  
These fuel price trends are consistent for all three capacities for a booming economy in the third 
quarter 2007 and during the recession in the third quarter 2009.  Profitable schedules were found for both 
quarters examined, even in the third quarter 2009 when most airlines were reporting significant losses. 
 
The results of a linear regression for airline profit for EWR over two years, for three airport capacity 
limits and for four different fuel prices provides insights into the correlations between the variables and 
the significant factors that influence airline decisions on markets served (Table 21). 
EWR 
Profit





L -.110 +.934 +1.257
N $5.884 +1.030 +1.317





L -0.269 0.537 0.569
N 6.511 +0.864 +1.071
H +0.059 +0.908 +1.096
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Table 21  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between airline profit 
and hedged fuel prices, GDP, and aircraft gauge. 
The analysis shows correlation between airline profit to fuel prices, GDP, and aircraft gauge.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified airline profit to be a function of capacity limits and 
aircraft gauge.  This relationship was found to be positive for all factors. The correlation accounted for 
91.6% (i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in airline profit. The remaining effects are inter-airline 
competition, changes in airline business models, and airline restructuring when emerging from 
bankruptcy.  The regression equation for daily airline profit is as follows: 
 
Profit = - 2.09 + 0.0167 Caps + 0.0489 Gauge 
4.2.3 Air Transportation Efficiency.  
4.2.3.1 Aircraft Size - The results of ASOM analysis of the average aircraft size scheduled for EWR are 
shown in Table 22.  This table shows the Baseline (underlined) Aircraft Gauge for ―Normal‖ Capacity 
Limits, and passenger demand. The remaining cells in the table show the change in aircraft gauge from 
this baseline.  The results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little effect on 
aircraft gauge, but significant increases in fuel prices increased the aircraft gauge.  In the table the 
underlined quantity represents the baseline ASOM results for aircraft gauge for normal capacity limits 
and fuel prices in line with historic prices for the quarter examined.   
 
Table 22  Sensitivity of EWR Aircraft Gauge to Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity Limits.  
These fuel price trends are consistent for all three capacities for a growing economy in the third 
quarter 2007 and during the recession in the third quarter 2009.  Profitable schedules were found for both 
quarters examined, even in the third quarter 2009 when most airlines were reporting significant losses. 
EWR 
Gauge
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correlation 0.568 0.789 0.128 0.219 0.113 0.942
P-Value 0.014 0 0.613 0.382 0.654 0
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Figure 16 shows the how the ASOM schedule of daily flights by aircraft class for EWR 3QTR 2007 
changes as fuel prices are increased.  This figure shows that the ASOM increases 75 and 275 seat aircraft 
in EWR’s schedule as fuel prices increase.  
 Figure 16   ASOM increases 75 and 275 seat aircraft in EWR’s schedule as fuel prices increase 
The results of a linear regression for aircraft gauge at EWR over two years, for three airport capacity 
limits and for four different fuel prices provides insights into the correlations between the variables and 
the significant factors that influence airline decisions on aircraft gauge (Table 23). 
 
Table 23  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between aircraft gauge 
and hedged fuel prices and GDP. 
The analysis shows correlation between aircraft gauge to fuel prices and GDP.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified aircraft gauge to be a function of fuel prices, gross 
domestic product, and airport capacity limits.  This relationship was found to be positive for gross 
domestic product and fuel prices, and negative for airport capacity limits.  The correlation accounted for 
96.9% (i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in aircraft gauge. The remaining effects are inter-airline 
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competition, changes in airline business models, and airline restructuring when emerging from 
bankruptcy.  The regression equation for average aircraft gauge is as follows: 
 
Gauge = - 1112 - 0.118 Caps + 11.8 GDP + 8.43 Fuel  Price 
 
These results from the ASOM model were not surprising because of the lack of economies of scale 
related to up-gauging.  A closer examination of the data shows that 100 and 200 seat classes show poor 
historic performance (cost per seat-hr).  The newest part of the airline industry fleet is regional jets that 
are more fuel efficient than the larger aircraft in the overall fleet.  Thus, as fuel prices increase, there is 
more incentive for the ASOM to move to smaller aircraft.  Figure 17 illustrates this point, where the 
smaller aircraft have better average cost per seat hour.  The B787 and A380 are more efficient aircraft but 
unlikely to be used for many of the markets currently served by these airports since they are relatively 
large aircraft. 
 
By using smaller aircraft the airlines can assure high load factors, greater frequency.  This result has 
significant implications for future airspace use. 
 
Figure 17  Poor Aircraft Performance ($/Seat-Hr) in 100 & 200 Seat Classes 
4.2.3.2   Total arrival and departure seats - The results of ASOM analysis of the total arrival and 
departure seats for EWR are shown in Table 24.  This table shows the Baseline (underlined) total arrival 
and departure seats for ―Normal‖ Capacity Limits (i.e. 80 operations/hour), and passenger demand at 
$2.08/gallon and $1.92/gallon. The remaining cells in the table show the change in arrival and departure 
seats from the baseline.  The results show that adjusting airport capacity limits up and down has little 
effect on total arrival and departure seats, but increases in fuel prices increases the total arrival and 
departure seats.  In the table the underlined quantity represents the baseline ASOM results for total arrival 
and departure seats for normal capacity limits and fuel prices in line with historic prices for the quarter 




























   
Table 24  Sensitivity of EWR total arrival and departure seats to Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity 
Limits.  
The results of a linear regression for total arrival and departure seats at EWR over two years, for three 
airport capacity limits and for four different fuel prices provides insights into the correlations between the 
variables and the significant factors that influence total arrival and departure seats (Table 25). 
 
Table 25  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between total arrival 
and departure seats to gross domestic product, number of direct service markets, and average 
aircraft gauge. 
The analysis shows correlation between total arrival and departure seats to gross domestic product, 
markets served, and aircraft size.   
 
The stepwise regression analysis identified total arrival and departure seats to be a function of 
scheduled flights per day, number of direct service markets and average aircraft size.  This relationship 
was found to be positive for scheduled flights per day, number of direct service markets and average 
aircraft size. The correlation accounted for 99.8% (i.e. R-squared) of the observed variation in total arrival 
and departure seats.  The regression equation for total daily arrival and departure seats is as follows: 
 
Seats = - 99427 + 128 Flights + 160 Markets + 684 Gauge 








correlation 0.28 0.903 0.194 0.542 0.424 0.874
P-Value 0.261 0 0.44 0.02 0.079 0
EWR 
Seats





L -3350 3100 -1050
N 104000 8300 1400





L -3900 3650 5750
N 77500 9650 13350
H -1100 12350 16550
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4.2.3.3   Total available seat miles scheduled - The results of ASOM analysis of the total available seat 
miles scheduled in and out of EWR are shown in Table 26.  This table shows the Baseline (underlined) 
available seat miles for ―Normal‖ Capacity Limits (i.e. 80 operations/hour), and passenger demand at 
$2.08/gallon and $1.92/gallon. The remaining cells in the table show the change in available seat miles 
from this baseline.  The results show that the total available seat miles are sensitive to changes in airport 
capacity and hedged fuel prices.  In the table the underlined quantity represents the baseline ASOM 
results for total available seat miles for normal capacity limits and fuel prices in line with historic prices 
for the quarter examined.   
   
Table 26  Sensitivity of EWR available seat miles to Hedged Fuel Price and Capacity Limits.  
The results of a linear regression for total available seat miles at EWR over two years, for three 
airport capacity limits and for four different fuel prices provides insights into the correlations between the 
variables and the significant factors that influence total available seat miles (Table 27). 
 
Table 27  Table shows statistically significant correlation (95% confidence) between available seat 
miles to GDP, number of direct service markets, scheduled flights per day, average aircraft gauge, 
and total arrival and departure seats. 
The analysis shows correlation between total available seat miles to GDP, markets served, scheduled 
flights per day, aircraft size, and total arrival and departure seats.  
  
The stepwise regression analysis identified total available seat miles to be a function of hedged fuel 
price and total arrival and departure seats.  This relationship was found to be positive for total arrival and 
departure seats and negative for hedged fuel price. The correlation accounted for 99.1% (i.e. R-squared) 
of the observed variation in total available seat miles.  The regression equation for ASMs is: 
 
ASM = - 10803115 - 1818714 Fuel  Price + 1273 Seats 








correlation 0.145 0.925 0.219 0.627 0.526 0.807 0.987
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L -7.7 -1.9 -0.3
N 85.4 10.0 11.7
H -0.9 11.7 13.7
59 
5 Conclusions 
The results of the analysis using the ASOM are as follows: 
1. The Air Transportation System is robust: Within the range of historic data,  geographic access, 
economic access, airline profitability, and air transportation efficiency exhibit proportional 
relationships defined by the linear regressions below: 
Markets = - 98.4 + 0.122 Caps + 1.61 GDP - 1.36 Fuel  Price 
 R-Sq(adj) = 60.4%  
 
Flights = - 1392 + 2.48 Caps + 18.9 GDP - 22.3 Fuel  Price 
 R-Sq(adj) = 85.5% 
 
Gauge = - 1112 - 0.118 Caps + 11.8 GDP + 8.43 Fuel  Price 
 R-Sq(adj) = 96.9% 
 
Seats = - 99427 + 128 Flights + 160 Markets + 684 Gauge 
 R-Sq(adj) = 99.8% 
 
ASM = - 10803115 - 1818714 Fuel  Price + 1273 Seats 
 R-Sq(adj) = 99.1% 
 
Profit = - 2.09 + 0.0167 Caps + 0.0489 Gauge 
 R-Sq(adj) = 91.6%  
 
Figure 18 identifies the relationships between factors. The multipliers establish the magnitude of the 
relationships between parameters. For example, a $1 increase in hedged fuel prices lead to a 22.3 
reduction in scheduled flights per day to all markets. A negative relationship indicates that a positive 
increase in the source, leads to a decrease in the result.  The bold lines show the direct and indirect 
contributions for airline profit. 
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  Figure 18   Summary of multipliers between the exogenous, economic access, geographic access, 
and airline profitability factors 
 
2. The Air Transportation System is Stable: Within the range of historic data, geographic access, 
economic access, airline profitability, and air transportation efficiency do not exhibit any 
significant changes in relationships.  
 For a fixed passenger demand and hedged fuel price, as capacity limits are imposed (e.g. -4 
operations per hour), markets are reduced (-.5) and scheduled flights per day to all markets 
decrease (-10), daily profit decreases        (-$67K). In this scenario average aircraft size 
increases (.44 seats per operation).  
 
 For a fixed passenger demand and fixed capacity limits at the airports, as hedged fuel prices 
increase (e.g. +$1 per gallon), markets are reduced (-1.4), scheduled flights per day to all 
markets decrease (-22.3), daily profit increases (+$411K). In this scenario average aircraft 
size increases (+8.4 seats per operation). This result is valid within the hedged fuel price 
range of $1.50 and $4 per gallon. 
 
3. Airport Capacity Limits Do Not Have Large Scale Negative Effects: Regulatory authority to 
manipulate the market through the introduction of airport capacity (and airport capacity limits) has no 
large scale effects. A modest reduction on the order of 4 slots per hour results in a loss of .5 market 
served and 10 flights per day. By shaving off the least profitable markets and flights per day, the 















































Reduction in 4 
ops/ hr (Capacity 
Limits) leads to … 
$1 increase in 
Hedged Fuel 
Prices per Gallon 
leads to ... 
1% drop in Gross 
Domestic Product 
(ref. 2005 GDP) 
leads to … 
Geographic Access - 
elimination of service ( 
e.g. smaller markets) 
-0.5 market & 
-10 Flights/ day  
-1.4 markets &   -
22 Flights/ day 
-1.6 markets &   -
19 Flights/ day 
Economic Access - 
increased airfares 
N/A  
$16 increase in 
airfare  
N/A 
Airline Finances - 
reduced profits 
Loss of $67K  per 
day 
Increase of $411K 




$577K per day 
through Aircraft 
Gauge Changes  
Air Transportation 











scheduled aircraft  
Table 28  Impacts of Airport Capacity Limits, Hedged Fuel Prices, and Gross Domestic Product on 
Geographic Access, Economic Access, Airline Finances, and Air Transportation Efficiency. 
 
4. Hedged fuel prices and economic health drive air transportation performance:  Regulatory authority to 
manipulate the market through the introduction of airport capacity (and airport capacity limits) is only 
one of three factors affecting geographic access, market access, and airline financial stability. 
Passenger demand for air transportation (measured by GDP) and airline operating costs (determined 
by fuel prices) have significant  impacts. 
For example, for a fixed passenger demand and hedged fuel price, as capacity limits are imposed 
(e.g. -4 operations per hour), markets are reduced (-.5) and scheduled flights per day to all markets 
decrease (-10), daily profit decreases (-$67K). In this scenario average aircraft size increases (.44 
seats per operation). 
 
Table 47 above demonstrates how an increase in hedged fuel price or a change in GDP results in 
loss of markets and flights, and small loss in profit. These factors both have the effect of increasing 
the average number of seats per aircraft. 
 
5. Combination of increased passenger demand and increased operating costs directly causes increase in 
aircraft size. It is financially viable for airlines to up-gauge in order to service the passenger demand.  
 
The airlines’ ability to up-gauge does not occur in the real-world due to: (1) distortions in the labor 
cost structure for pilots as a result of the pilot union scope clause labor agreements, and (2) (due to 
#1) aircraft manufacturers have failed to design and produce aircraft appropriate to match the 








1. Examine the possibility of relaxing Pilot Union Scope Clauses to incentivize aircraft 
manufacturers to produce, and airlines to acquire and deploy the correct sized aircraft (88 - 112 
seats) to match the passenger O/D market demand. 
 
2. Introduce capacity limits at congested airports. This has the effect of significantly reducing 
congestions and delays (across the NAS), without financial penalties to airlines or loss of 
geographic and economic access.  Introduce service standards at all of the 35 largest airports so 
that there is a metric in place that will warn airspace management personnel that a congestion 
problem is likely to occur unless capacity limits are imposed. 
 
3. Research and develop aircraft technologies (e.g. engines) to provide improved performance for 
the 88 - 112 seat class of aircraft. This improves airlines profits, and has the added benefit of 
reducing emissions. 
5.2 ASOM Experiments 1 & 2 Summary 
Table 29 summarizes the historical and ASOM statistical analysis of geographic access.   Clearly the 
ASOM experiment #2 provided a more balanced experiment to understand the impacts from the 




Table 29  Geographic Access Functional Models Summary 
Table 30 summarizes the historical and ASOM statistical analysis of air transportation efficiency.  
Relationships Historical Exp #1 Exp #2
Markets
Hedged Fuel Prices -1.4
GDP +1.44 +1.6
Caps +.44 +.12
Adj R2 25.2% 8.8% 60.4%
Flights per 
Day
Hedged Fuel Prices -55 -22.3
GDP +1.83 +18.9
Caps +2.8 +2.5
Adj R2 15.6% 17.4% 85.5%
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Table 30  Air Transportation Efficiency Functional Models Summary 
Table 31 summarizes the Historical and ASOM statistical analysis of airline profitability access.   
Clearly the ASOM experiment #2 provided a more balance experiment to understand the impacts from 




Table 31  Airline Profitability Functional Models Summary 
5.2.1 Geographic Access.  
The ASOM generates optimally profitable airline schedules; therefore the outputs can be directly 
examined for geographic access.  The number of markets served directly by an airport is primarily 
affected by the demand for air transportation. The number of flights per day to a market is also primarily 
determined by passenger demand. 
 
Capacity limits at airports did result in a small reduction in markets served and flights per day. Airline 
network restructuring, airline financial restructuring, and inter-airline competition also affected markets 
served and flights per day.   
 
Relationships Historical Exp #1 Exp #2
Profitability
/ Profit






Adj R2 79.6% 62.0% 91.6%
Relationships Historical Exp #1 Exp #2
Gauge















1. The fluctuations in hedged fuel prices (which impacts airline operational costs) is the primary 
determinant of the number of markets served. A linear regression showed that: for every $1 
increase in hedged fuel prices, there is a 1.9 decrease in the number of markets with direct 
service; for every $1 increase in hedged fuel prices, there is a decrease of 17.8 scheduled 
flights per day; and for every $1 increase in hedged fuel prices, there is a 6.4 seat increase in 
the average aircraft size flown. 
 
2. The growth/decay in demand for air transportation (as measured by the GDP) is a 
determinant of the number of markets served. A linear regression showed that: for every 
incremental increase in the GDP index, there is a 1.8 increase in the number of markets with 
direct service; for every incremental increase in the GDP index, there is an increase of 17.3 
scheduled flights per day; and for every incremental increase in the GDP index, there is a 
12.5 seat increase in the average aircraft size flown.  As the economy slowed, the number of 
markets with direct service decreased. 
 
3. The introduction of capacity limits (as measured by limits on number of operations per hour) 
is a determinant of the number of markets served. A linear regression showed that for every 
additional operation per hour allowed, there is a .1 increase in the number of markets with 
direct service; for every additional operation per hour allowed, there is an increase of 2.4 
scheduled flights per day. 
 
4. Airline network restructuring (e.g. Delta’s expansion at JFK), airlines financial restructuring 
(e.g. USAirways bankruptcy filing impacted PHL), and inter-airline competition also impact 
the number of markets served.   
5.2.2 Economic Access  
The ASOM generates optimally profitable airline schedules; therefore the outputs of markets served 
and airfares are a key input parameter for the model.  Regression analysis of airfare versus hedged fuel 
prices provides the basis for results for economic accessibility.  Passenger accessibility to air 
transportation through airfares at these airports followed established patterns of passenger demand during 
this period. Changes in the economy significantly affected demand for air transportation.  The economic 
downturn had an order of magnitude greater effect on airline airfares than did the change in airlines’ 
operating costs (as measured by changes in fuel costs).  
 
1. Cumulative elasticity at the airports ranged between -3.1 to -1.8 during this period. 
Specifically, a 1% increase in airfare (e.g. $300 to $330) resulted in a 3% reduction in 
demand for air service at that fare. This result is consistent with prior studies that showed 
passenger demand to be elastic. 
 
2. The change in airfare was driven by changes in hedged fuel prices (which impacts airline 
operational costs) (R2=83.1%).  At the five airports studied (LGA, JFK, EWR, PHL, and 
SFO), every $1 increase in hedged per-gallon fuel prices resulted in an average of $16 
increase in airfares, which yielded an average reduction in passenger demand of 1.5%. 
5.2.3 Airline Profitability.  
The ASOM generates optimally profitable airline schedules; therefore the outputs can be directly 
examined for airline profitability.  Airline profitability for the routes serviced at these five airports is a 
complex phenomenon driven by demand for air transportation, passenger’s responses to price increases, 
and operating costs. During this period, airline profitability was primarily determined by the industry’s 
ability to raise airfares relative to the cost of operations (i.e. when hedged fuel prices were escalating 
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dramatically).  During the spike in fuel costs, the airlines were faced with significantly greater operating 
costs and decreased demand due to the economic downturn. 
 
1. Inputs for the ASOM are preprocessed from historical data reflecting airline behaviors and 
responses to the exogenous factors.  Therefore the ASOM input data reflects: 
 
a. airline profitability decreased as airlines were unable to increase airfares as fast as hedged 
fuel prices increased. 
 
b. airlines shed less profitable markets in order to improve profitability. Similarly the 
ASOM algorithm will eliminate the least profitable markets and flights first, when 
adjusting the airline schedule within airport capacity. 
 
c. airlines decreased aircraft size in order to maintain profitability as demand decreased. 
Similarly the ASOM algorithm will use the most cost efficient aircraft to meet market 
passenger demand. 
 
2. Changes in airline profits are driven by changes in air transportation efficiency (as measured 
by gauge in this study) and airport capacity limits (R2=91.6%).   For example for passenger 
demand and operations at EWR, daily airline profits were increased $48.9K for every 
additional seat per flight operation, and increased $16.7 for every additional flight operation 
allowed per hour (increase to capacity limits).    
5.2.4 Air Transportation Efficiency.  
Air transportation efficiency is measured by the throughput of passengers through the network based 
on aircraft size (i.e. number of seats) per runway/airspace.  Air transportation efficiency is also measured 
by the total arrival and departure seats and by the total available seat miles scheduled in and out of the 
airport.   
1. A linear regression showed that: for every incremental increase in the GDP index, there is an 
11.8 seat increase in the average aircraft size flown; for every $1 increase in hedged fuel 
prices, there is an 8.4 seat increase in the average aircraft size flown; for each additional 
flight operation allowed per hour (increase to capacity limits), there is a decrease of .11 seats 
for the aircraft size flown.  This statistical relationship explained for 96.9% of the variations 
in aircraft gauge (R2=96.9%). 
2. Economic conditions (as measured by GDP in this study) and operational costs (as measured 
by hedged fuel prices in this study) effect changes in airline profit by driving changes in 
aircraft gauge.  For example for passenger demand and operations at EWR, average aircraft 
size was increased by 8.4 seats, which causes daily airline profits to increase $411K for every 
$1 increase in hedged fuel prices; also, average aircraft size was increased by 11.8 seats, 
which causes increased $577K for every incremental increase in the GDP index.   This result 
is valid within the hedged fuel price range of $1.50 and $4 per gallon. 
3. The change in the total arrival and departure seats was driven by changes in direct service 
markets, the scheduled flights per day to all markets, and the average aircraft size (seats per 
operation) (R2=99.8%).  Every additional direct market served added 160 seats to the total 
arrival and departure seats.  Each additional scheduled flight per day added 128 seats to the 
total arrival and departure, which represents the average aircraft size.  Increasing the average 
aircraft size by one seat added 684 seats to the total arrival and departure, which represents 
the average scheduled flights per day. 
4. The change in total available seat miles (ASM) scheduled in and out of the airport was driven 
by changes in hedged fuel prices (which impacts airline operational costs) and by the total 
arrival and departure seats (R2=99.1%).  Every $1 increase in hedged per-gallon fuel prices 
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resulted in a reduction of 1.8 million ASMs.  An incremental increase in the total arrival and 
departure seats resulted in an increase of 1273 ASMs. 
 
Note: These results are not consistent with the observed historical data. The historical data did not 
show the up-gauging experienced by the ASOM model. There are several explanations including: airline 
competition, fleet inflexibility, and airline pilot union scope clauses. 
5.3 Recommendations 
1. DOT and FAA should evaluate options to relax Pilot Union Scope Clauses that would allow 
incentives for aircraft manufacturers to produce, and airlines to acquire and deploy, aircraft in the 88 
– 112-seat range.  Currently, the oldest and least efficient part of the total airline industry fleet is 
within this category.  To economically up-gauge from a regional jet, the airlines need to move from a 
60-80 seat plane directly to a 120+ seat plane. Such a jump is often not economically viable. 
 
2. Introduce capacity limits at congested airports. This has the effect of significantly reducing 
congestions and delays (across the NAS), without financial penalties to airlines or loss of geographic 
and economic access. 
 
3. Research and develop aircraft technologies (e.g. engines) to provide improved performance for the 88 
– 112-seat class. The use of such aircraft will increase the efficiency of the airspace (i.e. more 
passenger throughput) and will also reduce emissions.  
5.4 Future Work 
5.4.1 Airline Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) to Complete the “Design of Experiment”.  
The historical analysis was dictated by the events that occurred during the period under study and 
provided an analysis of four of a possible 27 treatments (3 GDP % change possibilities x 3 fuel price % 
change possibilities x 3 airport capacity limit % change possibilities).  
 
To examine the effect of the remaining treatments, an optimization model was developed. The Airline 
Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM), calibrated using the historical data, is used in a follow-up study 
to evaluate the consequences of alternative combinations of economic conditions, changes in operating 
costs, runway capacity restrictions and airfare changes. The results of the study will complete the design 
of experiment and forecast what the airlines are likely to do if the economy has a significant upswing or if 
the government imposes capacity restrictions at other airports. 
5.4.2 Absence of Economies-of-Scale through Up-gauging (or “Cash for Clunkers”).  
During the calibration of the ASOM, it was observed that the optimization model failed to show the 
airlines increasing aircraft size from 80 to 100 seats. The ability to up-gauge in this range is critical to 
taking advantage of the concept of using the same runway slots to ferry additional passengers.  
 
This behavior is a result of the absence of economies-of-scales in up-gauging in this range. The 
significantly higher costs of operation at the 100-seat and 200-seat class of aircraft prevent airlines from 
up-gauging. In the 100 seat range the only aircraft in revenue-service are the older, DC-9 class that is 
more expensive to operate. No new, efficient aircraft are available in this range. This phenomenon 
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Appendix A: Validation of ASOM Model 
A.1 ASOM Consistency with Historic Results for Geographic Access 
Table 32 shows the summary results of a consistency check of the baseline ASOM results for markets 
served, scheduled flights per day and aircraft gauge when compared to the historic behavior of the airlines 
serving these five congested airports (LGA, EWR, JFK, SFO, PHL) for three different economic 
scenarios: (1) 3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; (2) 3QTR08 with $3.5 fuel prices and 105 
GDP index; and (3) 3QTR09 with $2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.  The ASOM scheduled on average 
2% fewer markets and 12% fewer flights for aircraft 5% smaller. 
 
Consistency in trends and relationships is the best the ASOM will allow, since the ASOM models 
airline scheduling behavior from an operational versus strategic position and the ASOM does not model 
airline competition.  The ASOM models only profitable markets, thus not strategically taking a short term 
loss to retain market demand.  The ASOM models balanced arrivals and departures, therefore no banking 
is allowed.  
 
The following sections will show consistency analysis results from comparing baseline ASOM results 
to historical data, comparing ASOM annual trends versus historic trends, and comparing opposite 
markets. 
 
Table 32  ASOM results for consistency check - geographic access 
A.1.1 ASOM Consistency with Historic Results for Markets Served 
The ASOM baseline results for markets served was compared to historic results for all five congested 
airports (LGA, SFO, EWR, JFK, PHL) for three different economic scenarios: (1) 3QTR07 with $2 fuel 
prices and 105 GDP index; (2) 3QTR08 with $3.5 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; and (3) 3QTR09 with 
$2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.  The results provide insights on ASOM consistency in predicting 
airline behavior. 
Table 33 shows 93% of ASOM profitable markets served within 4% of historical data.  The ASOM 
results showed on average 2% fewer profitable markets served; results for EWR 3QTR 2008, with peak 
fuel prices, showed 6% fewer profitable markets than the historical data. 
Markets flight/day gauge
Mean -2% -12% -5%
Standard Deviation 2% 5% 19%
Range 6% 19% 64%
Minimum -6% -21% -28%
Maximum 0% -2% 36%
Count 15 15 15
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Table 33  ASOM results for consistency check – markets served 
 
Table 34 shows 100% of ASOM profitable market annual trends within 3% of historical annual 
trends.  Additionally, 100% of these trends were in the same direction. 
 
 
Table 34  ASOM annual trends for profitable markets  
 
A.1.2 ASOM Consistency with Historic Results for Scheduled Flights per day 
The ASOM baseline results for scheduled flights per day were compared to historic results for all five 
congested airports (LGA, SFO, EWR, JFK, PHL) for three different economic scenarios: (1) 3QTR07 
with $2 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; (2) 3QTR08 with $3.5 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; and (3) 
3QTR09 with $2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.  The results provide insights on ASOM consistency in 
predicting airline behavior. 
Table 35 shows 87% of ASOM scheduled flights per day within 15% of historical data.  The ASOM 
results showed on average 12% fewer scheduled flights per day.  The ASOM results for LGA and SFO 
3QTR 2008, with peak fuel prices, showed 18% and 21% less scheduled flights per day respectively than 
the historical data. 
Cap LGA SFO EWR JFK PHL
3QTR
07-08
Hist* -6% -25% -12% 2% -10%
Model -3% -26% -15% 4% -10%
3QTR
08-09
Hist* 2% 18% 7% 6% 16%
Model 2% 18% 9% 6% 15%





















0% -2% -4% 0% -3%
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Table 35  87% of ASOM profitable markets served within 15% of historical data 
Table 36 shows 50% of ASOM annual trends for scheduled flights per day are within 10% of historic 
trends.  Additionally, 70% of these trends were in the same direction. 
 
  
Table 36  50% of ASOM trends for Scheduled Flights per day are within 10% of Historic trends 
Figure 19 shows PHL third quarter 2009 historical operations per hour by time of day versus the 
ASOM results for capacity limits set at 72, 80 and 96 operations per hour.  Modeled operations rarely 
meet the capacity limits since the model produces a domestic schedule therefore the historic international 
operations per hour are subtracted from the available capacity (72, 80 or 96) for domestic operations.  It is 
interesting to see where the model peaks its schedule when capacity limits are relaxed to 96 operations 
per hour versus where the peaks were historically.  But as clearly can be shown with this chart, the model 
is trying to create an optimal schedule that meets demand by time of day, by reducing redundant service 
and up gauging when economically beneficial. 
Cap LGA SFO EWR JFK PHL
3QTR
07-08
Hist* -6% 3% -10% 4% -10%
Model -17% -8% -16% -10% -11%
3QTR
08-09
Hist* -1% 9% 2% 4% 12%
Model 13% 24% 5% 13% 14%





















-7% -10% -11% -7% -13%
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Figure 19   ASOM Distribution of daily flights matches historical distribution 
 
A.1.3 ASOM Consistency with Historic Results for Aircraft Gauge 
The ASOM baseline results for aircraft gauge were compared to historic results for all five congested 
airports (LGA, SFO, EWR, JFK, PHL) for three different economic scenarios: (1) 3QTR07 with $2 fuel 
prices and 105 GDP index; (2) 3QTR08 with $3.5 fuel prices and 105 GDP index; and (3) 3QTR09 with 
$2 fuel prices and 103 GDP index.  The results provide insights on ASOM consistency in predicting 
airline behavior. 
Table 37 shows 67% of ASOM results showed lower aircraft gauge than historical data.  The ASOM 
results showed on average 5% smaller aircraft gauges than historically flown.  The ASOM results for 
EWR 3QTR 2007 and 2008 showed greater than 30% up-gauging when compared to the historical data. 
 
    
Table 37  ASOM consistency with historic results for aircraft gauge  
Table 38 shows 50% of ASOM annual trends for aircraft gauge are within 10% of historic trends.  
Additionally, 30% of these trends were in the same direction. 
















































   
Table 38  ASOM annual trends for aircraft gauge  
A.1.4 ASOM Comparison of Opposite Markets 
The ASOM results for opposite markets were compared for six market/ opposite market pairs for 
3QTR09 ASOM results.  The results provide insights on for predicting airline behavior. 
Table 39 shows 50% of ASOM opposite markets match with flights per day.  The ASOM results 
showed that LGA-PHL, EWR-SFO, and JFK-PHL market schedules matched well with their opposite 
markets.  However, the ASOM results showed that EWR-PHL, JFK-SFO, and PHL-SFO market 
schedules did not match their opposite markets.  The ASOM found reciprocal service from PHL to EWR 
and SFO not to be as profitable as other markets.  Also, the ASOM scheduled more than twice the number 
of seats from SFO to JFK as compared to the opposite market. 
 
    
Table 39  ASOM Comparison of opposite markets flights per day 
A.1.5 Historic versus ASOM Functional Relationships 
Table 40 summarizes the historical and ASOM functional relationships found in the analysis.  This 
ASOM analysis of airline behavior has revealed eight new functional relationships, not previously seen in 
the historic analysis (highlighted in green).  This analysis has also reinforced three and contradicted one 
functional relationship previously seen in the historic analysis (highlighted in yellow).  Five functional 
relationships found in the historic analysis were not evaluated by the ASOM (highlighted in orange).  
Thus the ASOM has reinforced and expanded upon known functional relationships previously found in 
historical analysis. 
Opposite Market Matches
Airport Market Flights Seats
LGA PHL 14 350
PHL LGA 14 350
EWR SFO 18 2950
SFO EWR 14 2850
JFK PHL 2 100
PHL JFK 4 100
Opposite Market no Match
Airport Market Flights Seats
EWR PHL 4 700
PHL EWR 0 0
JFK SFO 38 2150
SFO JFK 46 5550
PHL SFO 12 1100
SFO PHL 0 0
Cap LGA SFO EWR JFK PHL
3QTR
07-08
Hist* 0% 2% 0% 2% -1%
Model -10% 17% 4% -1% -1%
3QTR
08-09
Hist* -1% 2% 8% 9% 2%
Model 17% -12% -21% -17% -8%
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Table 40  The ASOM functional relationship with historical analysis 
Figure 20 graphically illustrates the finding shown in table 60.  Specifically the ASOM was consistent 
in finding positive relationships between gross domestic product and airline schedules, and the ASOM 
was consistent in finding a positive relationship between capacity limits and airline schedules.  Only one 
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access, economic access, and airline finances, extending the analysis of these factors using historic data (from Part 1 of the report). The Airline Schedule 
Optimization Model (ASOM) was used to evaluate how exogenous factors (passenger demand, airline operating costs, and airport capacity limits) affect 
geographic access (markets-served, scheduled flights, aircraft size), economic access (airfares), airline finances (profit), and air transportation efficiency 
(aircraft size). This analysis captures the impact of the implementation of airport capacity limits, as well as the effect of increased hedged fuel prices, which 
serve as a proxy for increased costs per flight that might occur if auctions or congestion pricing are imposed; also incorporated are demand elasticity curves 
based on historical data that provide information about how passenger demand is affected by airfare changes.
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